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Introduction
As the international community has gradually concluded that development and
sustainability are far from mutually exclusive, attention has been devoted towards
examining how to initiate sustainable development processes. Sustainable development
as a concept was first defined in a report released by the Brundtland Commission in 1987
titled “Our Common Future” as “development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”1 The concept
was elaborated upon in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and Development,
known as the Rio Earth Summit, out of which came some of the most defining
international environmental conventions to this day: Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, the Statement of Forest Principles, the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), and the UN Convention on
Biological Diversity.2
While there are many policy options for those looking to pursue sustainable
development agendas, the energy sector is often at the forefront of conversations
regarding sustainable development. One of the primary contributors to GHG emissions,
and consequently, climate change, is the energy sector: the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2014 Fifth Assessment Report states that “Emissions of CO2
from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes contribute about 78& of the total
GHG [greenhouse gas] emissions increase from 1970 to 2010.”3 Whereas energy systems

1

Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 1987).
“United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992),” United Nations, last modified
May 23, 1997, accessed November 11, 2018, http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html.
3
O. Edenhofer et al., eds., “Summary for Policymakers,” in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate
Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
2

2

fueled by the combustion fossil fuels release immense amounts of GHG emissions into
the atmosphere, renewable energy systems, .
A report released by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in
October 2018 states that the most important step that the international community must
take to address the acceleration of climate change is to confront existing unsustainable
energy systems.4 Thus, countries have increasingly looked to renewable energy
technologies as the effects of climate change become more catastrophic: the Renewable
Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, which tracks renewable energy policies
worldwide, reported that the number of countries with either a renewable energy target
increased from 45 in 2010 to 179 in 2017.5
As the impetus to expand global renewable energy resources grows, renewable
energy technologies are simultaneously becoming feasible for all, rather than only
developed, countries. The term “sustainable energy” has become paramount in the push
for sustainable development. While widely defined, sustainable energy sources “are
affordable, safe, and available in sufficient quantity to enable continued economic and
social development while promoting environmental stewardship.”6 Energy sources that
are commonly considered sustainable are wind, solar, hydro, geothermal, and biomass. A

on Climate Change (Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press,
2014), 5.
4
Coral Davenport, “Major Climate Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040,” The New
York Times, October 15, 2018, sec. Climate, accessed November 14, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-climate-report-2040.html.
5
Renewables 2005 Global Status Report (Washington, DC, USA and Paris, France: Worldwatch Institute
and Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century, 2005), 19; Renewables 2018 Global Status
Report (Paris, France: REN21 Secretariat, 2018), 19.
6
Building a Sustainable Energy Future (National Science Board, April 10, 2009), 9, accessed November 2,
2018, https://www.nsf.gov/nsb/publications/2009/comments_se_report.pdf.
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number of other terms are used to refer to sustainable energy sources, such as low-carbon
and renewable sources.
Renewable energy technologies are especially critical considering steadily-rising
demand for electricity worldwide. With rapid population growth, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimates in the World Energy
Outlook 2018 under its New Policies Scenario that global energy demand is set to
increase by more than 25% by 2040.7 The report also states that as solar photovoltaic
energy becomes more competitive, its installed capacity will eclipse that of wind before
2025, hydropower around 2030, and coal before 2040. Additionally, some models project
that coal has seen its heyday; under the New Policies Scenario, “a rising tide of
electricity, renewables, and efficiency improvements stems growth in coal
consumption.”8
In order for the international community to successfully shift away from fossil fuel
energy sources towards renewable options, significant resources must be allocated
towards the process of energy transitions. While there are multiple terms often used in
conjunction with energy transition, such as sustainability or low-carbon transition, energy
transition will be defined as “a change in the state of an energy system as opposed to a
change in individual energy technology or fuel source.”9 The field of energy transitions
encompasses a wide swath of intersecting disciplines, pulling from social, economic,
environmental, technological, and cultural perspectives. This research was borne out of

7

World Energy Outlook 2018: Executive Summary (International Energy Agency, November 2018), 1.
Ibid., 3.
9
Arnulf Grubler, Charlie Wilson, and Gregory Nemet, “Apples, Oranges, and Consistent Comparisons of
the Temporal Dynamics of Energy Transitions,” Energy Research & Social Science 22 (December 1,
2016): 18.
8
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studying energy transitions mainly in developed, Western nations, with a focus on entire
system transitions. Research on the dynamics of long-term shifts in society’s use of
energy resources has been ongoing since at least the 1960s.10
Academia discussing the process of energy transitions incorporates extensive theories
on topics such as sociotechnical change, technology diffusion, and energy transitions
more broadly. These theories parse out actors involved in transitions and the dynamics
governing their actions in different ways, assigning agency to a variety of stakeholders
from government to the private sector.
Yet even though the international community has reached a consensus on the
importance of shifting the makeup of global energy systems away from fossil fuels and
towards renewables, there is a notable lack of progress, especially in developing
countries. Energy transitions have been successfully completed in developed nations with
ample technical and economic resources; all countries in the Group of 20 (G20) had, as of
2017, implemented policies supporting power generation from large-scale renewable
energy systems.11 There is no dearth of knowledge and technical expertise regarding the
necessary processes to implement renewable energy systems; the technology and
innovations are confirmed to work. Rather, a lack of understanding of the factors not
merely technical impedes the successful diffusion of renewable energy systems: “While
several authors point to the central importance of understanding the political and sociocultural dimensions to the technological transition taking place across developing
10

Aleh Cherp et al., “Integrating Techno-Economic, Socio-Technical and Political Perspectives on
National Energy Transitions: A Meta-Theoretical Framework,” Energy Research & Social Science 37
(March 1, 2018): 176.
11
IRENA, Opportunities to Accelerate National Energy Transitions through Enhanced Deployment of
Renewables, (Report to the G20 Energy Transitions Working Group) (Abu Dhabi: International Renewable
Energy Agency, 2018), 15.
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countries, few authors have explored these aspects in empirical depth.”12 Considering that
empirical analysis has been primarily in terms of technology and economics, “[w]ork on
the political aspects . . . is almost non-existent, save for a handful of contributions dealing
with energy, climate change, and development more broadly.”13 A lack of empirical
evidence regarding the policy and societal processes necessary to facilitate low carbon
technology transfer has resulted in “policy rhetoric on low carbon technology . . .
fail[ing] to reflect the reality of how technology transfer can be achieved.”14
Many have found that frameworks originally constructed to analyze ongoing societal
transitions in Western, developed nations fall short of sufficiently accounting for the
unique variables and challenges faced by developing countries.15 Developing countries
across the globe are in the process of implementing their own renewable energy systems,
and must navigate a myriad of competing actors, interests, and policy realities. Research
on transitions in developing countries has substantially grown in the past ten years,
specifically in Asian and African countries, such as India, China, South Africa, and
Tanzania.16
One of such countries attempting to shift the makeup of its energy system towards
renewable sources is the central-Asian nation of Mongolia. The ongoing energy transition
in Mongolia is but a microcosm of a larger shift in development towards ensuring that as

12

David Ockwell et al., “The Uptake and Diffusion of Solar Power in Africa: Socio-Cultural and Political
Insights on a Rapidly Emerging Socio-Technical Transition,” Energy Research & Social Science 44
(October 1, 2018): 123.
13
Ibid.
14
Mahesh Sugathan and Muthukumara S. Mani, “The Role of Trade and Investment in Accelerating Clean
Energy Diffusion: Private-Sector Views from South Asia,” in Low-Carbon Technology Transfer: From
Rhetoric to Reality, ed. David G. Ockwell and Alexandra Mallett, First. (London: Routledge, 2012), 5.
15
Anna J. Wieczorek, “Sustainability Transitions in Developing Countries: Major Insights and Their
Implications for Research and Policy,” Environmental Science & Policy 84 (June 1, 2018): 204–216.
16
Ibid., 211.
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energy system interventions are undertaken in developing countries, they take into
account two underlying considerations: development and climate.17 There has been little
research done on the diffusion of renewable energy technologies in Mongolia in
particular, specifically using the methods and frameworks common for analyzing energy
transitions. Mongolia is classified by the World Bank as a lower middle-income country;
electricity in Mongolia is primarily generated by coal fired power plants constructed in
the mid-1900s during Mongolia’s Soviet rule. 18 These power plants are unsustainable,
and discussions to replace them have been ongoing for decades.19
According to Mongolia’s National Statistics Office, the population of Mongolia in
2017 population was 3,177,899 across Mongolia’s 603,909 square miles, making it one
of the least densely populated (by some accounts, the least densely populated) countries
in the world.20 Out of the total population, 1,462,973 are estimated to live in Ulaanbaatar,
the capital of Mongolia.21 The rest of the population is primarily nomadic, residing across
the country throughout Mongolia’s 21 aimags (provinces).
For Mongolia in particular, undertaking an energy transition towards renewable
energy systems is pragmatic. In 2001, the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Natural
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) released the “Wind Energy Resource Atlas of
Mongolia,” detailing the wind resources in all provinces in Mongolia as well as potential
17

Laurence Delina, “Multilateral Development Banking in a Fragmented Climate System: Shifting
Priorities in Energy Finance at the Asian Development Bank,” International Environmental Agreements:
Politics, Law and Economics; Dordrecht 17, no. 1 (2017): 75.
18
“Mongolia | Data,” World Bank Data, accessed October 3, 2018,
https://data.worldbank.org/country/mongolia.
19
Third National Communication of Mongolia Under the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (Ulaanbaatar: Ministry of Environment and Tourism, May 2018).
20
“Mongolia,” Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook, accessed November 4, 2018,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mg.html.
21
Үндэсний Статистикийн Хороо, “Хүн Ам,” Үндэсний Статистикийн Хороо, accessed December
15, 2018, http://1212.mn/Stat.aspx?LIST_ID=976_L03.
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sites for prospective wind energy projects. Sponsored by the DOE and the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID), the Atlas was meant to “help accelerate the
large-scale use of wind energy technologies in Mongolia.”22 The NREL found that about
10% of Mongolia (equivalent to 160,000 km2) has “good-to-excellent wind potential for
utility scale applications” (Figure 1).23 NREL estimates Mongolia’s total renewable

Fig. 1. Wind electric potential of Mongolia (Wind Energy Resource Atlas of Mongolia, 2001).

energy potential to be 2.6 terawatts (TW), with a potential electricity output from the
country’s solar and wind resources combined of 15,000 terawatt-hours (TWh) per year.
This output would be “enough to meet the total electricity demand of neighbouring China

22

D Elliott et al., Wind Energy Resource Atlas of Mongolia (National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
2001), 1.
23
Ibid., x.
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in 2030.”24 Additionally, while Mongolia’s experience with large-scale renewable energy
systems is limited, small-scale systems (such as standalone solar panels) exist across the
country, particularly in rural and nomadic households.25
Increased utilization of renewable energy sources is advantageous to Mongolia for
multiple reasons. Mongolia has been dramatically affected by climate change. A study by
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) found that under the “business-as-usual (BAU)
scenario in which current patterns of development continue,” Mongolia will be the
country most severely affected in terms of percentage loss of annual gross domestic
product (GDP) due to climate change.26 With climate change, both the magnitude and
frequency of extreme weather events will likely increase; these events include both
droughts and dzuds, which are “[e]xtreme weather event[s] or condition[s] that can be
caused by sudden heavy snowfall, long-lasting or frequent snowfall, extreme cold or ice,
or storms that cause often massive livestock deaths from hunger, exhaustion, and cold.”27
Herders also report experiencing other effects of climate change, such as overall
decreases in precipitation, including the earlier melting of snow; decreases in both
biodiversity and the number of pasture plant species; and the drying up of rivers, lakes
and springs.28
For the Mongolian government, developing renewable energy technologies advances
multiple policy priorities, such as increasing access to electricity, bolstering the country’s

24

Yong Chen, Gürbüz Gönül, and Makhbal Tumenjargal, Mongolia: Renewables Readiness Assessment,
2016, XIV.
25
“Projects: Renewable Energy for Rural Access Project (REAP),” World Bank, last modified 2013,
http://projects.worldbank.org/P099321/renewable-energy-rural-access-project-reap?lang=en.
26
Michael Westphal, Economics of Climate Change in East Asia (Asian Development Bank, 2013), 154.
27
Asian Development Bank, Making Grasslands Sustainable in Mongolia: Adapting to Climate and
Environmental Change (Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2013), x.
28
Ibid.
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sustainability, mitigating hazards existing from the current reliance on coal, and
positioning Mongolia as a serious participant within the growing global renewable energy
market.
This paper will analyze Mongolia’s ongoing energy transition using socio-technical
theory, specifically, the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP). The literature review will
discuss ongoing societal discussions about sustainable development and the undertaking
of energy transitions, as well as socio-technical frameworks commonly drawn on to
analyze such transitions. Chapter II will explore the application of the MLP to developing
countries’ energy transitions in particular, noting the theory’s shortcomings in describing
these transitions and looking at proposals to make the MLP more accommodating.
Chapters III through V will employ the MLP to examine Mongolia’s ongoing energy
transition towards renewable energy systems and additionally consider discrepancies
between Mongolia’s own experiences and the trajectory described by the MLP. Finally,
Chapter VI will supplement information in previous chapters by introducing data
collected from surveys disseminated in locations throughout Mongolia.
Methodology
Research for this thesis was conducted primarily using online and print resources.
One of the main limitations for this thesis was the limited availability of online and up-todate resources on the status and details of Mongolia’s ongoing energy transition. In order
to account for these informational gaps, in-person surveys and interviews were
additionally conducted in Mongolia in two phases—May 2017 and March 2019. The
survey process, which took place in May 2017, is discussed in Chapter VI. Interviews
were conducted in both May 2017 and March 2019. The second phase of interviews were

10

conducted in Ulaanbaatar from March 19, 2019 to March 22, 2019. Interviewees were
identified with assistance from employees from the School for International Training, as
well as prior connections established during the first interview phase. Survey and
interview (in May 2017) research was approved by the Local Review Board. Interviews
conducted in March 2019 were exempt from review by the Institutional Review Board at
Claremont McKenna College.
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Chapter I: Literature Review
The question of how to achieve “sustainable development” has posed a monumental
challenge for the international community since the term was initially defined in 1987. At
the forefront of this challenge are questions regarding the relative responsibility,
obligation, and action of each actor in the international community towards achieving the
elusive goal of sustainable development.
The international community has attempted for decades to unite for the purpose of
facilitating “development.” At the Millennium Summit in 2000, members of the UN
adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which sought overall to reduce
extreme poverty worldwide by 2015.29 Following the conclusion of the Summit, the goals
specified in the Declaration became known as the eight Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs): to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education,
promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality, improve maternal
health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental
sustainability, and form a global partnership for development.30
Considering that the time period established for the MDGs ended in 2015, the UN
decided in 2012 to develop post-2015 goals to build on the MDGs, which prompted the
formation and adoption of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. The
SDGs aim to encompass the multi-faceted nature of sustainable development as an
overarching target—rather than being centered around a focus of ending extreme poverty,
the goals call for implementing strategies to improve and address healthcare, inequality,
29

United Nations General Assembly, “A/RES/55/2 ‘United Nations Millenium Declaration’” (United
Nations, September 18, 2000).
30
“United Nations Conferences, Meetings and Events: Millennium Summit,” United Nations, accessed
April 23, 2019, https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/millennium_summit.shtml.
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infrastructure, economic growth, environmental challenges, and more, recognizing that
these strategies must be highly interconnected.31
The interconnectedness of sustainable development issues demands a corresponding
interconnectedness amongst engaged actors. For a solution to be implemented, it must be
both approved and forged by not only all levels of government, but the private sector,
civil society, and the general populous as well. Actors within transitions can include
community members, the media, officials at every level of government, civil society
groups, and advisory bodies, all of which are motivated by not just “cost-benefit
calculations but also entrenched beliefs, conflicting values, competing interests, unequal
resources, and complex social relations.”32 The vast number and relative position of
stakeholders means that in addition to the diffusion of new technologies, successful
implementation of low-carbon technologies involves “changes in user practices, cultural
discourses, and broader political struggles.” 33 There is widespread contention between
relevant actors as to best practices for implementing low-carbon solutions, which is
exacerbated by the knowledge that technologies will only be successfully adopted if they
both “successfully harness technical principles” and align with relevant social norms.34
An additional challenge is posed by the existential motivation driving many
sustainable development processes, in particular, energy transitions. Due to the
underlying intent of mitigating climate change (which demands high levels of
coordination) driving low-carbon transitions, such transitions are purposive, or goal31

United Nations, “Sustainable Development Goals,” Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform,
accessed April 23, 2019, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs.
32
Frank W. Geels et al., “The Socio-Technical Dynamics of Low-Carbon Transitions,” Joule 1, no. 3
(2017): 463.
33
Ibid., 464.
34
Ibid.; Sugathan and Mani, “The Role of Trade and Investment in Accelerating Clean Energy Diffusion:
Private-Sector Views from South Asia,” 10.

13

oriented, rather than emergent, or uncoordinated, as historical transitions have been.35
This means that actors involved already have some sort of pre-determined vision as to
what the transition should accomplish, which due to the large number of actors involved,
can result in tension between opposing agendas.
That sustainable energy transitions are often initiated as a means to mitigate the
effects of climate change also adds a unique dimension of temporal pressure to the
transitions. This precludes many processes involved in transitions, including low-carbon
technology transfer, from happening at the pace of natural market and innovation
processes.36 Historically, energy transitions are considered to take decades, potentially
even longer than a century, to fully unfold.37 While the timeline of a transition highly
depends on the relative definitions and position of whomever is defining the transition, it
is commonly accepted that society’s transition to clean energy sources must happen at a
pace far more rapid than we have traditionally been accustomed to.38
Energy transitions are also hindered by the economic nature of the climate change
problem, in that the responsibility for dealing with climate change is a tragedy of the
commons. The ultimate goal of low-carbon technology transfer is to deliver a public good

35

Adrian Smith, Andy Stirling, and Frans Berkhout, “The Governance of Sustainable Socio-Technical
Transitions,” Research Policy 34, no. 10 (December 1, 2005): 1501–1502.
36
Sugathan and Mani, “The Role of Trade and Investment in Accelerating Clean Energy Diffusion:
Private-Sector Views from South Asia,” 7.
37
Arnulf Grubler, “Energy Transitions Research: Insights and Cautionary Tales,” Energy Policy 50,
Special Section: Past and Prospective Energy Transitions - Insights from History (November 1, 2012): 11.
38
Benjamin K. Sovacool, “How Long Will It Take? Conceptualizing the Temporal Dynamics of Energy
Transitions,” Energy Research & Social Science 13, Energy Transitions in Europe: Emerging Challenges,
Innovative Approaches, and Possible Solutions (March 1, 2016): 202, 211.
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(such as climate change mitigation), but the transfer itself must be incentivized “in the
absence of an obvious market.”39
Additional barriers to sustainable energy transitions in developing countries exist
beyond those realized by the nature of the climate change problem. Barriers posed by any
traditional energy transition are exacerbated by the limited institutional capacity of many
developing countries, requiring technology transfer to simultaneously occur both
horizontally (between countries) and vertically (from research stages to implementation
or research and development), whereas for many developed countries, this transfer would
occur only vertically.40 Other broad categories of barriers include market structure,
infrastructure, financial, institutional, interaction, technological, behavioral, political, and
more.41 Many scholars have devoted attention to identifying both barriers to renewable
energy diffusion and potential strategies for overcoming these barriers.42
I.1 Theory on Transitions
Given that the challenges posed by the prospect of sustainable development are so
broad, scholars have turned to theoretical frameworks to help dissect and clarify the
ongoing dynamics present in such challenges. This allows sustainable development to be
viewed not only as a nebulous, ideological ideal, but rather as a logical process that can
be approached systematically and analytically wherein society is transitioning from using
incumbent to novel systems. Transitions have been widely studied; a transition can be
39

Sugathan and Mani, “The Role of Trade and Investment in Accelerating Clean Energy Diffusion:
Private-Sector Views from South Asia,” 7.
40
Ibid.
41
Ingrid Mignon and Anna Bergek, “System- and Actor-Level Challenges for Diffusion of Renewable
Electricity Technologies: An International Comparison,” Journal of Cleaner Production 128 (August 1,
2016): 107.
42
J.P. Painuly, “Barriers to Renewable Energy Penetration; a Framework for Analysis,” Renewable Energy
24 (2001): 73–89.

15

defined as a “radical, structural change of a societal (sub)system that is the result of a coevolution of economic, cultural, technological, ecological and institutional developments
at different scale-levels.”43 Transitions are required to address persistent problems
“related to systemic failures that have crept into our societal systems, which, contrary to
market failures, cannot be corrected by the market or conventional policies.”44 Due to the
fact that “[t]ransitions involve mutually coherent changes in practices and structures,” the
nature of transitions is both complex and comprehensive.45 Literature on sustainability
transitions has increased as efforts to identify the best pathways towards addressing
social, economic, and ecological challenges have increased. The multi-faceted nature of
these challenges requires an approach that fully takes into account all parts of the existing
systems that society seeks to change. Moreover, these systems themselves are complex—
transitions aim to uproot existing structures related to energy, healthcare, education, food,
mobility, and more.46
The complexity of transition processes has led to the development of many
approaches to describe the interrelated parts of transitions. A commonly-used
overarching framework to describe transitions is the multi-phase concept, which is
derived from complex adaptive systems theory.47 This framework describes transitions in
four phases—predevelopment, take-off, acceleration, and stabilization (Figure 2). In the
predevelopment phase, the status quo does not change visibly but there are changes in the
background to the former state of equilibrium. The take-off phase occurs when the “state
43
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of the system begins to shift.”48 In the breakthrough phase, change to the system begins
to be visible; these changes can be socio-cultural, economic, ecological, and institutional.
This phase involves learning, diffusion, and embedding processes as well. Finally, the
stabilization phase occurs when “the speed of social change decreases and a new dynamic
equilibrium is reached.”49

Fig. 2. The different phases of a transition (Adapted from Rotmans et al., 2001:17).

In addition to the multi-phase concept, socio-technical theory has also been applied to
explain transitions. The concept of a socio-technical system has been used by many since
at least the mid-twentieth century to describe systems, such as those aforementioned,
whose operation relies on more than purely technology: “technologies do not fulfil
societal functions on their own . . . Only in association with human agency, social
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structures and organisations do artefacts fulfil functions.”50 Socio-technical systems are
those that, in addition to technology, also take into account socioware, or how societal
elements factor into the development of a technology. Socio-technical systems consider
both technology and the institutions necessary to facilitate successful diffusion and use of
said technology.51 Sustainability transitions are often discussed as a subset of sociotechnical transitions, as they describe the processes through which established sociotechnical systems either evolve or are replaced by more sustainable systems.52
Energy systems are considered socio-technical due to the fact that while energy
infrastructure is, at its core, a technological system, energy infrastructure does not operate
autonomously, and requires constant oversight and maintenance from government and
industry.53 Due to the unsustainability of historically-utilized fossil-fuel energy systems,
energy is often at the forefront of many conversations regarding sustainability transitions.
In the case of a socio-technical transition from a fossil-fuel reliant energy system to a
renewable energy system, the persistent problem to be addressed is society’s reliance on
fossil fuel-driven energy systems.
Theory on socio-technical transitions is rooted historically in concepts from
evolutionary economics, sociology, and science and technology studies (STS).54 Sociotechnical transitions are co-evolving (innovative technologies must be developed, put into
50
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use, adopted, and ultimately societally embedded), multi-actor, radical (in terms of the
innovation required, not the speed of the transition), long-term, and macroscopic.55
Socio-technical theory is predicated on historical descriptions detailing the interaction
between technology and society, established through STS.56 The process in which
technology is developed is also multi-faceted, and was described by Bruno Latour as
“heterogeneous engineering”: not only must technology be physically developed, but the
process also involves mobilizing resources, creating social networks, constructing
markets and necessary regulatory regimes, and developing visions.57 A similar term,
coined by Thomas Hughes, is “seamless web,” used to further establish that the evolution
processes for society and technology are not separable—the process is one of
coevolution.58
Beyond socio-technical theories, other disciplines have contributed to the field of
energy transitions by proposing alternative frameworks. In addition to socio-technical,
frameworks are also categorized as techno-economic or political.59 The main differences
between these frameworks revolve around the academic disciplines that ground each—
for techno-economic, this is economics, Earth sciences, and engineering; for sociotechnical, this is evolutionary economics, history, and sociology; for political, this is
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political science.60 Others advocate for examining energy transitions as other processes
(such as a geographical process), yet the main domains through which energy transitions
have been examined are those aforementioned.61
I.2 Socio-Technical Heuristic Frameworks
Within socio-technical frameworks, four are primarily studied in the context of sociotechnical transitions: the multi-level perspective (MLP), strategic niche management
(SNM), technological innovation systems (TIS), and transition management (TM).62
Across these four frameworks, a central concept is that of the socio-technical regime and
presence of niche developments.63
I.2.1 Multi-Level Perspective
The MLP was developed in the latter half of the twentieth century by scholars seeking
to form a bridge between STS and evolutionary economics.64 The framework describes
interactions between three levels—the “niche” level, “regime” level, and “landscape”
level—and aims to explain “how incumbent (and unsustainable) technological regimes
can be ‘destabilised’ through ‘niche’ developments.”65 Levels of the MLP constitute a
nested hierarchy: niches are embedded in regimes, which are embedded in the landscapes
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(Figure 3).

Fig. 3. Multiple levels in a nested hierarchy (Geels, 2002:1261).

In order for niche innovations to break through, changes in the landscape often exert
pressure on existing regimes, eventually opening up the regime (Figure 4). This can
happen as a result of multiple scenarios, such as a change in user preferences, increased
negative externalities from the expansion of existing regimes, society perceiving existing
regimes as threatening, internal technical problems within a regime, or if firms invest in
innovation as a competitive strategy.66
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Fig. 4. A dynamic multi-level perspective on transitions (Geels, 2002:1263).

I.2.2 Strategic Niche Management
Strategic niche management is “a concentrated effort to develop protected spaces for
certain applications of a new technology.”67 Protected spaces allow technologies to
evolve from simply being ideas or suggestions into usable and fully-developed entities.
SNM advocates for three internal processes that must occur for the successful
development of a technological innovation: articulation of necessary technological and
institutional changes, learning processes (including assessing economic, social, and
technical feasibility; anticipated gains; alignment with existing systems; anticipated
effects), and the building of social networks to constitute a constituency of supporters for
the product who are able to facilitate necessary systematic shifts. A fourth external
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process includes stimulating further development of the niche technology, as well as of
complementary technologies and policies necessary to support the niche innovation.68
The utility of SNM arises from its ability to assess the state of niches to subsequently
inform policymaking, and the framework has been found useful for analyzing the
dynamics of technological cases.69 Considering the highly technical nature of energy
systems, SNM is frequently applied in energy transition analysis.70
I.2.3 Technological Innovation Systems
The Technological innovation systems (TIS) framework is one subset of the larger
group of frameworks on innovation systems. The first of these was the concept of
national systems of innovations, rooted in theory on evolutionary economics.71 The
concept of innovation systems refers to all factors involved in innovation processes; “all
important economic, social, political, organizational, institutional, and other factors that
influence the development, diffusion, and use of innovations.”72 The efficacy of
technology transfer is largely influenced by national systems of innovation, or “networks
of institutions that initiate, modify, import, and diffuse new technologies.”73
Technological innovation systems differ from national systems in that, rather than
referring to the entirety of the national system, they refer to “specific techno-industrial
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areas.”74 Technological systems both foster the development of niche innovations and
support existing technologies.75 Rather than being used to describe the overarching and
broad nature of transitions, TIS has traditionally focused on analyzing specific
technological systems for the purpose of informing policymaking.76
I.2.4 Transition Management
The transition management (TM) framework is used to further structure the
governance processes of ongoing transitions with a long-term normative goal of
sustainable development.77 The MLP serves as the underlying theory that TM further
builds on in order to formulate a comprehensive management strategy. It is a “processoriented philosophy that balances coherence with uncertainty and complexity” born out
of insights from governance approaches and complex systems theory.78 Rather than
providing an explanation for a transition, transition management aims to provide tools to
work towards a transition more generally, with the assumption that the transition will
eventually offer collective benefits. The process involves regular re-evaluation of the
goals and practices fueling the transition.79 In addition to the MLP, transition
management utilizes the multi-phase concept describing four phases of transitions:
predevelopment, take-off, breakthrough, and stabilization.80 TM was introduced in 2001
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in the fourth Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (NMP4) as official government
policy. Rather than set explicit goals, the NMP4 outlined sweeping societal ambitions,
recognizing that achieving these ambitions would require fundamental system changes
and transitions.81 The plan utilized the TM cycle (Figure 5), which details four
governance arenas: strategic, tactical, operational, and reflexive.82

Fig. 5. Transition management cycle (Loorbach, 2010:173).

I.3 Multi-Level Perspective
Out of the four aforementioned socio-technical frameworks, the MLP will be used to
examine Mongolia’s ongoing energy transition. This selection is apt because in contrast
to TIS and SNM, the MLP does not place heightened emphasis on the development of
niche innovations; in a similar vein, the specific bottom-up development of niche
81
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technologies is not an integral part of Mongolia’s transition. The MLP was also chosen
given that many more studies use the MLP than transition management, which has been
additionally criticized for its Eurocentric slant and subsequent incompatibility with
factors common in developing contexts.83
Rather than focusing solely on a singular aspect of society and its contribution to
transitions, the MLP reflects the diversity and multidisciplinarity of structures within
socio-technical systems. Transitions are both brought about and hindered by technoeconomic, business, political, social, and cultural factors. The MLP has been utilized to
analyze historical and ongoing transitions across many socio-technical systems, such as
the British transition from sailing ships to steamships and America’s transitions from
piston engine aircraft to jetliners as well as from horse-drawn carriages to automobiles.84
I.3.1 Landscape Level
The first level of the MLP is the landscape level, “an external structure or context for
interactions of actors.”85 Due to the exogenous and overarching structure of the
landscape, it is “beyond the direct influence of regime and niche actors.”86 The landscape
encompasses both literal landscape traits—such as physical geography, available
resources, and climate—as well as more theoretical components, such as broad societal
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trends, economic cycles, and political constellations.87 There are no actors unique to the
landscape level; rather, landscape changes arise as a result of either independent
occurrences or actions by regime and niche actors.88
Considering the scope of the landscape, it undergoes change at a much slower pace
than regimes.89 Often, factors that contribute to landscape shifts are described temporally.
There are factors that change either slowly or not at all (i.e. the climate), factors that
change in the long-term (i.e. German industrialization), and rapid exogenous shocks (i.e.
oil price fluctuations, wars). Altogether, these factors cannot be influenced in the shortterm; rather, they combine to make up a larger external context that is the landscape
level.90
I.3.2 Regime Level
A technological regime is “the rule-set or grammar embedded in a complex of
engineering practices, production process technologies, product characteristics, skills and
procedures, ways of handling relevant artifacts and persons, ways of defining problems—
all of them embedded in institutions and infrastructures.”91 Socio-technical regimes,
specifically, refer to the rules that various social groups abide by, and are responsible for
the stability of a sociotechnical system.92 Regimes describe the institutions, paradigms,
practices, economics, and dominant structures specific to a technology, as well as to a
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societal function or ecosystem.93 At the regime level is where incumbent94 actors,
technologies, and systems operate. The regime can be influenced by changes both at the
niche level or the landscape level. Socio-technical regimes make up the more intangible
components of an overarching incumbent socio-technical system, which additionally
includes tangible components such as “technologies, industries, supply chains,
consumption patterns, policies, and infrastructures.”95
Regime change is driven by multiple factors at a time interacting with one another.
While each of these factors change relatively autonomously, their collective evolution
results in changes in the existing regime (Figure 6).96 Table 1 further explains potential
drivers of regime

Fig. 6. Co-evolution between regime components (Grin, Rotmans, & Schot, 2011:21 [adapted from Geels, 2004: 912]).
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tensions, demonstrating how these tensions can arise from any part of society. Existing
regimes may begin to fracture if, alongside the exacerbation of regime tensions, nicheinnovations are sufficiently developed to the point where they are able to compete with
incumbent structures.97
Table 1
Drivers of regime tensions (Adapted from Geels et al., 2017:467).

Societal sphere
Techno-economic
Business
Social
Political
Cultural

Drivers of regime tensions
technical failures, disruption of infrastructures, accumulating negative
externalities (e.g., CO2 emissions)
shrinking markets, economic difficulties in incumbent industries, loss
of confidence in existing technologies and business models,
reorientation toward alternatives
disagreement and fracturing of social networks, defection of key social
groups from the regime
eroding political influence of incumbent industries, declining political
support, removal of supportive policies, introduction of disruptive
policies
negative cultural discourses undermine the legitimacy of existing
regimes (e.g., coal and climate change, diesel cars, and air quality)

Barriers to change. That regimes are upheld by numerous interlocking rules means
that niche innovations are only able to break through incumbent structures if these rules
are either weakened or altered. These rules can be separated into three categories:
regulative, normative, and cognitive.98 Examples of regulative rules include regulations,
laws, and standards; normative rules include behavioral norms, values, and role
relationships; cognitive rules include guiding principles, user practices, market
perceptions, goals, and problem definitions. These rules interlock and reinforce one
another, accounting for what is classified as “lock-in” of socio-technical systems.99 For
example, engineers and designers are bound by cognitive rules and routines towards
97
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existing directions, causing them to ignore extraneous developments.100 Similarly,
organizations resist changes because of developing “webs of interdependent relationships
with buyers, suppliers, and financial backers . . . and patterns of culture, norms, and
ideology.”101 These dynamics can contribute to path dependence, wherein the outcomes
of future and current states depends on previous states’ paths.102
I.3.3 Niche Level
Innovations at the niche level are characterized by their deviation from the incumbent
system; examples include “a new behavioural practice (e.g. car sharing), a new
technology (e.g. battery-electric vehicles), a new business model (e.g. energy service
companies, or a combination of these.”103 Innovation that occurs at the niche level is of a
different nature than innovation within an existing regime. Rather than the incremental
innovation that may take place within existing energy regimes, niche level developments
are often talked about in terms of necessitating “radical” or “breakthrough”
innovations.104 Niches allow these radical innovations to be protected from existing
market structures while they are still being developed.105 Niche innovations “gain a
foothold in particular applications, geographical areas, or markets (e.g., the military), or
with the help of targeted policy support.”106 Developments at the niche level can be
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technological, but may also include novel policies implemented with the purpose of
nurturing niche technologies.
At the niche level, much of the structure that the regime level is characterized by is
absent. The makeup of actors is constantly in flux, resulting in unstable networks where
rules are imprecise and opaque. The maintenance of niches thus requires sustained effort
from the actors involved to upkeep niche development.107
Radical innovations, or novelties, can remain in niches for any duration of time
depending on the existing regimes and landscapes; novelties often remain in niches for
long periods of time. This can be for multiple reasons related to the existing regimes:
novelties may require extensive technological development, dragging out the period of
time until they are ready to be brought into the regime, the regime may be incompatible
with the novelty, or “existing regime actors actively oppose niche-innovations,” leading
to the imposition of barriers to prevent novelties from breaking through. The stability of
existing regimes is also relevant—the more stable existing regimes are, the less likely
novelties will be able to break through. All levels are important; “it is the alignment of
developments—successful processes within the niche reinforced by changes at regime
level and at the level of the sociotechnical landscape—which determine if a regime shift
will occur.”108
Similar to the number of potential pathways that can contribute to the formation of
regime tensions, niche developments can gain momentum through many different
avenues (Table 2).
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Table 2
Drivers of niche momentum (Geels et al., 2017:467).

Societal sphere
Techno-economic
Business
Social
Political
Cultural

Drivers of endogenous niche momentum
price/performance improvements as a result of R&D, learning by doing,
scale economies, complementary technologies, and network externalities
new entrants or incumbents from other sectors are more likely to drive
radical innovation than traditional incumbents. Their success may lead
to “innovation races” when other firms follow a first mover
growing support coalitions and constituencies improve available skills,
finance, and political clout
advocacy coalitions lobby for policy changes that support the niche
innovation such as subsidies and supportive regulations
positive discourses and visions attract attention, create cultural
enthusiasm, and increase socio-political legitimacy

Barriers to change. Niche-innovations often face resistance from the existing regime
structures, and their ability to break through is dependent largely on circumstances
surrounding the regime, which is in turn dependent on landscape conditions. It is also
possible that circumstances may position the regime to be open to the introduction of
niche technologies; however, if niche-innovations are not fully developed, they will not
be able to capitalize on this opening. The relationship between niche developments and
existing regime structures can also inhibit break through. If niche-innovations are able to
be incorporated into the incumbent structure, existing symbiotically, then they are able to
be adopted regardless of a distinct opening in the regime.109 Niche-innovations can also
be stunted if their development is not supported, either financially or ideologically, by
champion actors.
I.3.4 Typology of Transitions
Recognizing that transitions arise from many different circumstances as a result of
variation within regimes and niche actors, as well as contextual landscape factors, Frank
Geels and Johan Schot developed four pathways for socio-technical transitions:
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transformation, technological substitution, reconfiguration, and de-alignment and realignment.110 These pathways differ based on timing and the nature of interactions
between the levels of the MLP. Each has different main actors, and pressure for change
manifests at different levels depending on the involvement of these actors.
In order to further delineate the dynamics of change that occur within each pathway,
Geels and Schot utilize the typology for environmental change that Fernando Suarez and
Rogelio Oliva propose. Using the attributes of frequency, amplitude, speed, and scope,
five different classifications for environmental change are identified (Table 3). Geels and
Schot use this typology to apply to the MLP; each pathway exhibits one or more of the
types of change, which can occur at any level.
Table 3
Attributes of change and resulting typology (Suarez & Oliva, 2005:1022).

Frequency
Low
High
Low
Low
Low

Amplitude
Low
Low
High
High
High

Speed
Low
High
High
Low
High

Scope
Low
Low
Low
Low
High

Type of environmental change
Regular
Hyperturbulence
Specific shock
Disruptive
Avalanche

Transformation. In the transformation pathway, moderate landscape changes
(disruptive change) apply pressure to existing regime systems; however, nicheinnovations are not sufficiently developed to be able to take advantage of potential
regime openings as a result of landscape pressure. Regime changes are initiated by
incumbent actors responding to criticism voiced by outside groups.111
Technological substitution. In this pathway, niche-innovations are developed
sufficiently so that when enough landscape pressure is applied to the existing regime,
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niche developments are able to penetrate and replace incumbent systems. This
breakthrough is not possible without sufficient landscape changes—which typically
occurs in the form of a specific shock, avalanche change, or disruptive change—and
resulting pressure due to highly entrenched regime structures. Rather than being
developed by actors in the incumbent regime, niche-innovations are developed by
outsiders, and receive minimal attention from incumbent actors, who do not feel
threatened by the presence of niche-innovations.112
Reconfiguration. In the reconfiguration pathway, niche-innovations do not necessarily
clash with the existing regime. Instead, niche-innovations are symbiotic; the regime
adopts these innovations to solve existing problems. Eventually, this adoption continues
until the incumbent regime is reconfigured to account for the presence and utilization of
the symbiotic innovations.113
De-alignment and re-alignment. This pathway involves the collapse and erosion of
the existing regime as a result of significant landscape change, to the point that actors
lose faith in the incumbent systems. Niche-innovations are not necessarily sufficiently
developed at the point of erosion; thus, multiple niche technologies may compete until
one is identified as dominant. This dominant niche-innovation will eventually become the
foundation that allows for the re-alignment of a new regime.114
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Chapter II: Application of the MLP to Energy Transitions
in the Global South
The MLP has been consistently applied as a heuristic framework for socio-technical
transitions, in particular, energy and low-carbon transitions, such as the German and
Dutch electricity transition to renewables.115 Thus, as the impetus on developing
countries to undertake energy transitions has grown, scholars have identified the MLP as
a useful tool for analysis. Using the MLP as a guide, components of energy transitions in
select case studies of developing countries will be discussed, as well as the applicability
of the MLP to these transitions. Discrepancies between the application of the MLP to
developed versus developing countries will also be identified and discussed.
II.1 Landscape Level
Whereas regime and niche developments in developed countries have historically
contributed to patterns and circumstances at the landscape level, similar developments in
the global South have been less present. Thus, the landscape context framing many
developing countries’ energy transitions has been formed by actors and actions outside of
the developing country’s direct sphere of influence. While the landscape level has
traditionally been described as beyond the direct influence of actors, niche and regime
actors involved in developing countries’ transitions are often motivated by deliberate
efforts by international organizations to reconfigure normative policy priorities. In the
1990s, for example, multilateral development agencies such as the World Bank pushed
for developing countries to implement reforms for the liberalization of their energy
115
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sectors.116 Similar dynamics are the result of other international efforts by organizations
such as the UN and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, both of which have
undertaken concerted efforts to educate and equip the public with information about
climate change and sustainable development. Energy transitions may also be driven by
landscape shifts that result from price fluctuations of particular energy sources, such as
rising oil or coal prices.117
II.2 Regime Level
II.2.1 Drivers of Regime Tension
Reflecting the holistic nature of socio-technical systems, regime change can be
initiated by developments across any aspect of society. It is important to note that the
characterization of incumbent regimes in the MLP is biased towards developing
countries— often, these regimes have been in place for numerous decades at a minimum,
and are therefore highly integrated not only within directly relevant aspects of society but
society as a whole. Reliance on these regimes leads to entrenchment, resulting in path
dependency and lock-in, and making it more challenging for niches to break through.
Regimes in developed countries most often evolved from knowledge and capacity
already present in said countries, or in countries with societally similar circumstances.
The seminal MLP diagram (Figure 3) presents regimes as uniform systems.
However, this presentation of regimes is inapplicable in many ways to developing
countries. Regimes in developing countries are often composed of technologies diffused
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not from the developing countries themselves, but rather developed countries. This
diffusion results in widespread variations in the nature of these regimes depending on an
individual country’s own domestic landscape context.118 As a result, regimes are often
non-uniform, and are more likely to experience internal tensions. This non-uniformity
also contributes to a different standard of regime stability:119 “The presupposition of a
‘universal infrastructure ideal’ in [large technical systems] and [multi-level transitions]
theories can help to explain their lack of traction for studies focused on the [global]
South, where infrastructure is often characterized by ‘archipelagoes’ and disrepair or
even dilapidation.120
II.2.1.1 Technological
Incumbent systems may experience technical difficulties as a result of aging
technology or demand limitations, resulting in the need to pursue alternative system.121
II.2.1.2 Markets and Finances
Given rapid population growth and industrialization in developing countries, many
are driven to explore renewable or sustainable energy systems as a result of increasing
energy demand.122 Moreover, having a healthy economy allows a developing country
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with may be appealing to international investors, paving the way for actors such as
development banks or other countries to invest in alternative energy sources.123
II.2.1.3 Political
Domestic governments play a large role in incentivizing firms to produce renewable
energy technology. Incentives can be multi-faceted and cultivated either directly or
indirectly. Examples of government involvement are domestic renewable energy policies,
subsidies, declaring a renewable energy target, trade-related incentives, and more.124
Policies incentivizing the use of low-carbon technologies “can play a strong role in
overcoming cost barriers and developing markets for new low carbon technologies.”125
Governments can encourage a clean energy market in three ways: implementing policies
that either directly or indirectly encourage the purchase of clean energy, as well as
purchasing renewable energy directly.126
II.2.1.4 Socio-Cultural
Co-benefits—such as climate change mitigation and reduced air pollution—from
utilizing sustainable energy sources can further incentivize governments to undertake
energy transitions.127 Governments may seek to initiate energy transitions to address
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systemic societal challenges, such as endemic poverty or widespread lack of access to
electricity.128
Also relevant are pre-existing relations between developing countries and the
international community. A documented history of being open to international actors can
prime a developing country to receive financial assistance from donors for further
reforms and development projects: “Kenya’s adoption of neoliberal reforms in the energy
sector has been rewarded by support from bilateral and multilateral donors, opening up
opportunities for foreign capital to meet the shortfall in energy supply.”129
The public’s increased ability to obtain information about new technologies and
global trends has also contributed to the weakening of regimes. For instance, in Kenya,
increased media attention on climate change has allowed the public to become more
knowledgeable about the availability and benefits of clean technologies.130
II.2.2 Barriers to Regime Change
II.2.2.1 Political
Because the MLP was initially criticized for failing to account for state autonomy and
agency, the state as an autonomous actor has increasingly received attention through
applications of the MLP. Yet this attention must be carefully applied to developing
contexts, where states are often limited by institutional capacity and highly dependent on
foreign aid. While these states are not powerless—in many cases they are still responsible
for controlling electricity systems—“state capacity and autonomy to chart and pursue
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lower-carbon pathways is shaped by their relations with various other actors and is
unevenly distributed.”131
Policymakers are also limited in their ability to affect change as a result of competing
agenda priorities. Especially in developing countries, the prospect of sustainability is just
one of many areas for societal growth. Policymakers’ primary motivation for
implementing policies that accomplish climate change mitigation is rarely simply
mitigation; rather, these actors are primarily driven by goals such as bolstering energy
security, creating jobs, fostering new green industries, or increasing public revenue.
Climate change mitigation is, at best, merely a co-benefit.132
Even in countries with liberalized energy markets, regulations at the regime level can
still act as barriers to burgeoning RE producers. Large electric utility companies will act
to further enforce or regulate existing barriers to prevent RE producers from entering the
market. In general, little research has been done on the effects of various regulatory
regimes for developing countries’ RE industries.133
The political climate of developing countries can also hinder regime change from
taking place. For instance, in Ethiopia, geopolitical conflicts with bordering nations as
well as internal political instability further perpetuates low levels of competition.134
II.2.3.2 Socio-Cultural
Incumbent regimes are also protected by existing societal attitudes, including
society’s acceptance (or lack of) towards a new or emerging technology. Many barriers to
131
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the successful incorporation of niche developments into the existing regime “can be
considered as a manifestation of lack of social acceptance.”135 Increasingly, studies have
been done on the role that social acceptance plays in diffusion. Studies in the 1980s
showed that support at any level—be it from the public or crucial stakeholders—could
not be taken for granted.136
Social acceptance can be broken down into further categories, namely, socio-political
acceptance, community acceptance, and market acceptance (Figure 7).

Public acceptance
Socio-political
acceptance

Stakeholder's acceptance
Policymaker's acceptance

Social acceptance of
renewable energies
(geothermal, wind, solar)

Distributional justice
Community
acceptance

Procedural acceptance
Trust
Consumers' acceptance

Market
acceptance

Investors' acceptance
Intra-firm acceptance

Fig. 7. Diagram of social acceptance dimensions (Adapted from Hosseini, 2018).

Socio-political acceptance refers to the broadest level of social acceptance and
includes acceptance of technologies and policies by the public, key stakeholders, and
policymakers. Results from years of opinion polls indicate that the majority of the public
agrees with renewable energy concepts, leading many to think that worldwide social
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acceptance of renewables is subsequently high. However, this is not the case; “[t]his
positive overall picture for renewable energy has (mis)led policy makers to believe that
social acceptance is not an issue.”137
Community acceptance relates to how local stakeholders and community members
accept renewable energy decisions. There are three components within community
acceptance: procedural justice, distributional justice, and trust. Procedural justice
concerns whether or not the decision-making process allows equal access to participation
for all stakeholders, distributional justice concerns the distribution of costs and benefits
among stakeholders, and trust is in terms of whether or not the local community trusts
information regarding the implementation of renewable energy.138 The concept of trust is
critical to the successful implementation of renewable energy projects.139 Within
community acceptance is the concept of NIMBY-ism, which stands for “not in my
backyard” and refers to the phenomenon that occurs when individuals support renewable
energy on principle as long as it isn’t present in their own backyard.140 Theory on
community acceptance also describes a U-shape pattern regarding individuals’
perceptions of renewable energy projects—acceptance is high during proposal and lead
up stages, then dips once the logistical components are being carried out, and finally
increases again once the project is fully in operation.141
Market acceptance refers to how the market adopts an innovation. Market acceptance
considers consumer, investor, and intra-firm acceptance, and is related to socio-political
137
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acceptance due to the fact that as stakeholders, firms can influence the political process
and political decisions made regarding renewable energy.142
Cultivating public appeal for low-carbon technology transitions can also be
challenging, as there is not always an obvious constituent base to support such
transitions. Whereas other political policies can be associated with clearly defined
benefits, the benefits of low-carbon transitions “are displaced in space and time from
those who pay for them.”143 Roberts discusses the need to form coalitions to support lowcarbon transitions, considering that, as Newell and Paterson note, successful transitions
“will have to be supported (financially and politically) by powerful fractions of capital
with a stake in the success of such a project.”144
II.3 Niche Level
II.3.1 Drivers of Niche Momentum
While the conceptual nature of operations at the niche level are unchanged for
developing countries, a significant disparity arises in the actors who are primarily
responsible for developing and nurturing niche-innovations. Within developing countries’
energy transitions, the niche level in particular is characterized by significant levels of
involvement from exogenous and international actors.
II.3.1.1 Technological
For many developing countries, rather than being developed domestically from the
ground up, niche technologies are often both fully developed and successfully operating
142
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in developed countries at the time of transition, making traditional niche development
obsolete. Instead, niche technologies are introduced and nurtured through processes such
as technology transfer. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), technology transfer is defined as
the broad set of processes covering the flows of knowledge, experience and
equipment amongst different stakeholders such as governments, private sector
entities, financial institutions, NGOs and research/educational institutions. The broad
and inclusive term “transfer” encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology
cooperation across and within countries. It comprises the process of learning to
understand, utilize, and replicate the technology, including the capacity to choose it
and adapt it to local conditions.145
Technological learning refers to individuals’ and organizations’ accumulation of
“technological knowledge and experience,” and results in the accumulation of
technological capabilities.146 Technological learning is “not an automatic by-product of
investments,” and can only occur under the right conditions, which must be facilitated by
both the government and domestic firms.147 Looking at Thailand, it was found that
“technological learning can, in the near future, reduce the cost of renewable electricity in
emerging economics to a level that is close to competitiveness with fossil fuels,” and
additionally, “the major potential for cost reductions through learning lies in the build-up
of local technological capabilities” (emphasis in original).148
Technology transfer is primarily understood to occur between developing and
developed countries, where the conventional development paradigm utilized by those
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studying transitions in developing countries asserts that “innovations originate from the
North and need to be absorbed by the South.”149
In order to catalyze technology transfer processes, international actors have
developed various mechanisms and tools to expedite and incentivize technology transfer.
One of the most well-known methods for facilitating low-carbon technology transfer is
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), established under the Kyoto Protocol.
Through the CDM, “a country with an emission-reduction or emission limitation
commitment under the Kyoto Protocol,” referred to as an Annex B Party, can implement
emission-reduction projects in developing countries and earn certified emission reduction
(CER) credits. Each CER is equivalent to one ton of CO2, and can be traded and sold by
industrialized countries to count towards their own emission reduction targets set by the
Kyoto Protocol.150
Similar to the CDM, the joint implementation mechanism allows Annex B countries
to implement emission-reduction projects in other Annex B countries. Countries then
earn emission reduction units, also equivalent to one ton of CO2, which can be counted
towards their own Kyoto emission reduction target.151
International organizations have been paramount in the movement to facilitate lowcarbon technology transfer in developing countries. Technology transfer encompasses
many different processes, such as capacity building, technical training and technological
learning, and transfer of intellectual property. Most technology transfer takes place in the
149
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private sector.152 In order to promote the development of climate technologies, the UN in
particular has overseen the establishment of multiple mechanisms and frameworks. These
include the Technology Mechanism (2010), the Technology Executive Committee
(policy arm of the Technology Mechanism), the Climate Technology Centre and Network
(implementation arm of the TM), Technology Framework (established in the Paris
Agreement to “provide overarching guidance to the work of the Technology
Mechanism”), and technology needs assessments (established in 2001).153
Another critical aspect of technology transfer is intellectual property. In 1995, the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement as part of the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement was entered into force. The TRIPS Agreement
details issues related to intellectual property rights (IPRs), “establishes standards of
protection as well as rules on administration and enforcement of intellectual property
rights,” and “provides for the application of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to
resolve disputes” related to topics discussed in TRIPS.154
II.3.1.2 Markets and Finances
Given that many developing countries experience rapid population growth, energy
demand is rarely stagnant. Fluctuations in energy demand and subsequent government
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action to shift the makeup of energy systems can lead to increased incentives to explore
alternative energy sources.155
The political and economic structure required for the facilitation of low-carbon
technologies varies; “[e]vidence is mixed on whether coordinated market economies are
better at accelerating low-carbon transitions.”156 Those successful at promulgating lowcarbon technologies do not strictly adhere to principles of capitalism that emphasize
“interrelationships between labour markets, welfare, electoral systems and types of
innovation.”157
Financing for the implementation of renewable energy systems in developing
countries has primarily come from developed countries and international organizations.
Bilateral financial assistance from developed to developing countries often manifests in
the forms of official development assistance (ODA), direct loans, or foreign-direct
investment (FDI). The OECD Development Assistance Committee defines ODA as
“government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and
welfare of developing countries.”158 ODA must be both “provided by official agencies”
and “concessional . . . and administered with the promotion of the economic development
and welfare of developing countries as the main objective.”159 Governments can also
receive loans from either governments or multilateral funding institutions.160 FDI
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“involves direct investment in physical plant and equipment in one country by business
interests from a foreign country.”161
International organizations are also highly involved in funding projects and processes
as a part of energy transitions. Multiple MDBs have historically driven the provision of
mitigation financing. In 2014, the African Development Bank reported that mitigation
financing was divided between seven different MDBs totaling $23.3 billion, with the
majority (26%) coming from the World Bank.162 Assistance from MDBs can come in
multiple forms, such as loans, grants, technical assistance, or a combination of multiple
or all of the three.163 Aside from MDBs, multiple international organizations operate
under mandates to provide financing for environmental or sustainable projects; the
concept of sustainable financing has rapidly grown as more countries seek to implement
environmentally sustainable projects. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was
founded in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit to provide funds for “developing countries and
countries with economies in transition to meet the objectives of the international
environmental conventions and agreements.”164 In a similar vein, the Green Climate Fund
(GCF) was established at the Conference of Parties (COP) 16 in 2010 by UNFCCC
parties to serve as part of the Convention’s financial arm. The GCF aims to direct climate
finance for the purposes of adaptation and mitigation actions taken in developing
countries. Importantly, the GCF places specific emphasis on the ownership of developing
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countries in projects, and requires countries to designate an individual to liaise between
the GCF and the country’s government.165
In addition to the aforementioned mechanisms to reduce emissions, the Kyoto
Protocol also initiated the Adaptation Fund, established in 2001 for the establishment of
adaptation projects “in developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.”166
II.3.1.3 Political
Considering that many countries lack established policy to address renewable energy,
many of the policies to govern renewable energy sectors are developed at the niche level.
Regarding options for the implementation of RE policies, two of the most common are
feed-in tariffs (FITs) and renewable portfolio standards (RPSs). Both are aimed at
creating a renewable energy market—thus, their implementation is indicative of a
country’s goal to include RE in its long-term energy regime. By creating long-term
markets for RE, both policies are able to reduce the risk to investors. RPSs and FITs have
been adopted at both the national and subnational level. Multiple actors, including
international donors, businesses, and NGOs have been active in pushing developing
countries to implement both policies. Even with this wide support, each option’s relative
effectiveness is contested. Studies done across OECD and non-OECD countries reach a
variety of conclusions on the results of FIT implementation.167 Feed-in tariffs “provide
RE producers with a preferential price per unit of generation (e.g., kWh) over a set period
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of time (e.g., 10 to 15 years), designed to enable investors to recover their investments
over time.”168 RPSs, also referred to as “quota systems,” “are mandates rather than
financial incentives,” and “require utilities to procure a specified percentage of electricity
generation or sales from renewable sources.”169
II.3.1.4 Socio-Cultural
The globalization of actors involved in producing clean technologies necessitates the
occurrence of both global and local learning processes in order for the successful
diffusion of clean technologies. Regarding the implementation and dissemination of
technologies on the ground, local learning occurs as it does in traditional investment
projects, where local firms are responsible for driving the local market and, in many
cases, producing at least a component of the goods and services. Global learning
processes are incorporated as companies located abroad become increasingly responsible
for the production of necessary components. Thus, the investment conditions present in
developing countries pursuing clean technologies are contingent upon both “global and
local learning processes, which, in turn, depend on domestic and international regulatory,
institutional, and industrial contexts.”170
II.3.2 Barriers to Niche Breakthrough
II.3.2.1 Technological
Whether a country is able to successfully absorb technology through technology
transfer depends on its absorptive capacity, or its ability to assimilate and apply new
information received from external sources. This ultimately depends largely on a
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country’s prior related knowledge.171 Absorptive capacity is also highly indicative of a
country or organization’s innovative capabilities.172
The IPCC describes 10 different policy tools governments can employ to create
enabling environments for technology transfer. These include national systems of
innovation; social infrastructure and participatory approaches; human and institutional
capacities; macroeconomic policy frameworks; sustainable markets; national legal
institutions; codes, standards, and certification; equity considerations; rights to productive
resources; and research and technology development.173 Rather than efficacy, the main
challenge facing developing countries’ ability to employ these tools is limited
institutional capacity.
While multiple international initiatives have been launched to facilitate technology
transfer in developing countries similar to the CDM, their effectiveness is debatable. The
cost of funding activities such as R&D or bolstering institutional capacity and innovation
capabilities has precluded such initiatives from making a sustained impact on countries
where they are implemented.174
A unique challenge to technology transfer in developing countries through
collaborative research and development (R&D) stems from the fact that traditionally,
private firms have been the subject of collaborative R&D specifically in industries of
commercial interest to said firms—thus, collaboration between private firms and
developing countries “for the purposes of delivering a public good . . . or specific
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considerations relating to climate technology R&D” has not occurred on the same
level.175 “[C]ollaborative climate technology R&D needs to involve a range of private,
public and not-for-profit actors, but can require involvement of developing country actors
that have limited innovation capacities and are therefore of little strategic interest to
international technology leading firms.”176
There is additionally an ongoing ideological debate regarding whether or not IPRs act
as a barrier to technology transfer. In 2013, Ecuador introduced the idea that climate
change technology may run into barriers with the TRIPS agreement.177 Views span from
IPRs most certainly acting as a barrier to technology transfer, to IPRs being a problem yet
not a relevant one, to IPRs not being a barrier at all.178 In the past, international climate
negotiations stalemated because of countries’ differing perspectives on IPRs and their
role in technology transfer.179 This debate has also taken the form of the North-South
debate, with more developed countries arguing for a lack of IPRs as a barrier to
technology transfer and developed countries taking the opposite position. The two sides
of this debate contest the importance of IPRs in technology transfer, with one arguing
that IPRs, primarily in the form of patents, prohibit access to new technologies. In
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contrast, other countries argue that the main barrier to technology transfer in developing
countries is a lack of IPR law—IPRs are seen as a catalyst.180
Limited institutional and productive capacity also hinders countries’ ability to
produce niche technologies. Many developing countries lack either sufficient raw
materials or the production lines to assemble materials, necessitating the import of
resources and making countries vulnerable to consistency of supply and price
fluctuations. These vulnerabilities impede manufacturing and eventual implementation of
niche developments.181
II.3.2.2 Markets and Finances
Due to the limited financial resources of many developing countries, energy
transitions are often financed by outside actors, such as multilateral development banks
or international NGOs. Donor interventions are often heavily present. These interventions
are “planned development programs and projects that are funded either by multilateral
organizations, such as the World Bank and agencies of the United Nations, or by bilateral
donor agencies that distribute aid between countries.”182 Donor interventions can affect
both the regime and niche levels. At the regime level, interventions may include policy
advising, institutional support and technical training, capacity-building for government
agencies and other regime actors.183
In the event that donor countries provide RE subsidies for developing countries, these
subsidies “can actually undermine nascent markets for RE by creating an expectation
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among customers that such products should be free or subsidized.184Moreover, “direct
donor investment as a type of subsidization does little to catalyze private investment” in
the RE sector.185 Instead of donor support going towards subsidization, better outcomes
would likely result if support is channeled towards policy and market reforms.186
Developing countries may also face challenges attracting investment if project
developers perceive the uncertainties or risks of an investment to outweigh the potential
profits, as seen in Malaysia.187
II.3.2.3 Political
While helpful in many respects, the presence of transnational actors, specifically in
the form of donor interventions, may present additional challenges to the uptake of niche
innovations in developing countries. The necessitation of holistic support, in addition to
mere project development, is a key measure of whether or not a niche experiment will
succeed. Rather than the technology itself, political and institutional aspects are the main
barriers to successful upscaling of niche technologies. Projects designed with support
from strong vertical linkages (such as complementary policies at the regime level) lead to
successful upscaling, whereas projects initiated by international development agencies,
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hich often lack these same linkages, “are seldom diffused” and rarely lead to overarching
shifts in practices.188
Although foreign direct investment (FDI) is often utilized in projects to increase RE
diffusion in developing countries, the efficacy of FDI in contributing to a robust domestic
RE industry is questionable. Using two different two-stage estimation methods, Pfeiffer
and Mulder modeled 108 developing countries’ choices (between 1980 and 2019)
regarding both whether or not to adopt renewable energy technologies and “the amount
of electricity to produce from renewable energy sources.”189 As Pfeiffer and Mulder
explain, domestic institutions are much more indicative of the probability that renewable
energy, specifically non-hydro RE (NHRE), is successfully adopted. Ultimately, they find
that “donor-driven investment and attention given to NHRE adoption are insufficient in
themselves to compensate for the fragile institutional environment in these countries.”190
Thus, rather than bolster the uptake of NHRE, the presence of ODA “reduces the
probability of NHRE adoption”; increasing FDI has been shown to lower the probability
of NHRE adoption.191
II.3.2.4 Socio-Cultural
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In many developing countries, underlying societal problems often eclipse
conversations about renewable energy and existential moral issues such as Western
notions of environmentalism and sustainability.192
The hindrance of niche development by donor presence is further documented. Rather
than providing the stability, predictability, and clarity that many donors advertise, it has
been shown that donor interventions “create new arenas for struggle over resources,
interests, meaning, interpretations and rationalities between various actors.”193
Ultimately, renewable energy technology development and reliance on RE are driven
by different factors; “simply increasing RE generation does not necessarily decrease
reliance on fossil fuels nor help countries make the transition to a clean energy
economy.”194
II.4 Suitability of the MLP for developing countries
Upon analyzing relevant factors of developing countries’ energy transitions, it is
apparent that many of the same factors present in developed countries’ transitions are
present. However, given that the MLP was developed for and initially applied to
transitions in developed countries, it has become increasingly apparent that the MLP does
not, in many ways, account for factors that are at the forefront of energy transitions in the
global South. This incompatibility is evident both in analyzing individual transitions and
in efforts to apply models utilizing the MLP to these transitions; none of the four
pathways described by Schot and Geels in their typology of transition pathways accounts
for the presence of transnational or intermediary actors.
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Anna Wieczorek’s systematic review of 115 publications about sustainability
transitions in developing countries provides a useful starting point for discussing the
shortcomings of traditional socio-technical frameworks (Table 4).195
Table 4
Summary of insights regarding developing countries’ sustainability transitions (Adapted from Wieczorek, 2018:212).

Major theme
Experiments and
upscaling

Transnational linkages

Stability and change
Path-dependence

Contextual factors
Normative orientation

Insights
There emerge transnational sustainability experiments that embody
novel sources of capability-formation other than industrialised firms
which challenges convergence theories.
Vertical and horizontal linkages are important for upscaling of
experiments.
Definition of sustainability experiments is useful but needs further
specification to create an effective design for developing countries.
Regime and niche actors are increasingly transnationally connected
and there are technology, capital and knowledge flows. However,
local assets and policies still play an important role.
Regimes in developing countries are less uniform than in the Western
world. Old technologies exist alongside new ones, providing the
same service.
Stability does not necessarily obstruct regime transformation in
developing countries. Many systems are absent or highly
dysfunctional.
Some aspects of path-dependence in developing countries (colonial
past) form barriers to sustainability transitions, while underdeveloped
or absent fossil fuel-based infrastructures provide opportunities.
Institutional contexts are place specific.
Landscape forces are not as exogenous as theory predicts and can
have a direct impact or be deliberately mobilised by niche actors.
Sustainability perception differs across societies, causing
disagreements about problems and their solutions.

Within the themes that Wieczorek identifies, transnational linkages, contextual factors,
and normative orientation are especially useful in cataloging how the MLP can be
augmented by other disciplines to better apply to transitions in developing countries.
Intermediaries, which she does not explicitly mention but are often mentioned in
conjunction with transnational linkages, are also relevant.
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Transnational linkages are “the cross-border relationships, infrastructures and
interactions that enable flows and circulations of resources including people (actors),
knowledge, technologies, institutions and finance.”196 Fields outside of socio-technical
theory are particularly relevant for providing insight on transnational linkages, such as
geography and political economy. Transnational linkages allow for “actors to
complement lacking resources,” thus further enabling innovation.197 These linkages are
especially common in the form of donor interventions, which as discussed, occur
frequently at both the regime and niche levels with Donor interventions at the niche level
may include direct financial support for the development of niche-level experiments.198
Moreover, the role of intermediaries in sustainability transitions has received
increasing attention. While intermediaries have been defined in a myriad of ways,
specifically in relation to transitions, “transition intermediaries” are
actors and platforms that positively influence sustainability transition processes
by linking actors and activities, and their related skills and resources, or by
connecting transition visions and demands of networks of actors with existing
regimes in order to create momentum for socio-technical system change, to create
new collaborations within and across niche technologies, ideas and markets, and
to disrupt dominant unsustainable socio-technical configurations.199
This definition reflects numerous definitions for intermediaries present in a number of
processes, where intermediaries are present at the niche, regime, and systemic levels, and
can assume their role as intermediaries intentionally or unintentionally.200 Increased
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attention to intermediaries reflects the increased focus on transnational linkages, in which
intermediaries are critical to facilitate cross-border dynamics.
Discussions on intermediaries and transnational actors reflect a lack of clarity on who
might be considered an actor at each level of the MLP. Specifically for the landscape
level, seeing as it is considered merely “background” wherein no activities happen within
it, any landscape change is either independent of any actors or results from actors
operating at the niche and regime levels.”201 However, as Wieczorek notes, the landscape
level has been found to be affected by action at the niche and regime levels, calling into
question the assumption that the landscape level is unable to be affected directly.202
There has been little consideration given to the normative aspects of transitions,
resulting in many highlighting that there is a lack of consensus regarding what
“sustainability” even is. Specifically in relation to the global South, environmental issues
in the form of existential, as opposed to concrete and definable, problems will be
dominated by issues such as a lack of access to electricity, widespread poverty, or general
social inequalities.203 Moreover, technologies or practices that Western nations see as
“sustainable,” such as renewable energy systems, are often perceived through different
normative lenses in developing countries. A statement by an interviewee in Tanzania
regarding incentives for solar energy stated: “It doesn’t have anything to do with climate
change; it is driven by rural electrification and people wanting electricity.”204
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Chapter III: Landscape Level
The landscape level describes the exogenous structure within which regime and niche
actors operate, and while “beyond the direct influence of regime and niche actors,” the
level is affected by both external events and broad, societal shifts that arise as a result of
actions by niche and regime actors.205 Relevant landscape factors for Mongolia’s energy
transition include the international community’s recognition of anthropogenic climate
change, attitude towards sustainable development, the nature of relationships between
developed and developing countries and the acceptance, promulgation of renewable
energy technologies, and normative framing. Relevant domestic landscape conditions
include Mongolia’s historic ties with the international community.
III.1 International Factors
III.1.1 Attribution of Global Warming to Anthropogenic Causes
Reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are published
periodically to inform the general public about the latest findings regarding climate
change as agreed to by the global scientific community. With every publication, the IPCC
has ratcheted up its attribution of the increase in global temperatures, and subsequent
changes in the global climate, to human activity. The IPCC’s 1990 First Assessment
Report did not confirm human responsibility for observed worldwide warming, stating
instead that:
The size of this warming is broadly consistent with predictions of climate models, but
it is also of the same magnitude as natural climate variability. Thus the observed
increase could be largely due to this natural variability, alternatively this variability
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and other human factors could have offset a still larger human-induced greenhouse
warming.206
The IPCC’s 1995 Second Assessment Report states that “The balance of evidence
suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate.”207 The attribution
of increase in global temperature to anthropogenic causes is more forceful with every
report: in 2001, warming is “likely” due to increases in GHG concentrations, in 2007,
“very likely,” and in 2014, the IPCC writes that “[i]t is extremely likely that more than
half of the observed increase in global average temperature from 1951 to 2010 was
caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other
anthropogenic forcings together.”208
Coupled with the heightened assignment of climate change to human activity is a plea
for society to undertake a fundamental shift away from unsustainable fuel sources. The
IPCC goes on to write in 2014 that “[t]he stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
at low levels requires a fundamental transformation of the energy supply system,
including the long-term phase-out of unabated fossil fuel conversion technologies and
their substitution by low-GHG alternatives.”209 This conclusion is reiterated in a 2018
IPCC report, which affirms “Pathways limiting global warming to 1.5˚C with no or
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limited overshoot would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in energy, land, urban
and infrastructure (including transport and buildings), and industrial systems (high
confidence).”210
III.1.2 Conceptions of Development
Following the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987, the international
community began to confront what a future in which sustainable development was
prioritized might look like. This reckoning began in the 1990s, particularly when the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, FCCC) was
adopted in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit. The Convention still reflected the attitude at
the time that development (e.g., economic and social development and poverty
eradication) should be developing countries’ main priority, and that the achievements of
development and environmental policies were, to a certain extent, mutually exclusive.
Ultimately, developing countries should fully develop first, and then focus on sustainable
development. Article 4.7 of the FCCC states:
The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their
commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by
developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to
financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that
economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding
priorities of the developing country Parties.211
These commitments, which are to be undertaken by all Parties to the Convention, include
tasks such as periodically reporting national emissions, implementing climate change
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mitigation programs, promoting sustainable management, developing mechanisms for
adapting to climate change, considering climate change in all policy formulation, and
participating in ongoing efforts to further understand climate change—practices widely in
line with the principles grounding sustainable development.212
As the international community sought to determine what processes would need to be
undertaken to achieve development, countries defined development through broad ideals
such as the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) formed in 2000. Whereas
“ensure environmental sustainability” was a single MDG, it is now recognized that when
properly implemented, sustainable development practices, and renewable energy systems
in particular, are potential solutions to many other aspects of development, such as the
eradication of extreme poverty and social inequality. Seven of the UN’s 17 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, explicitly mention “sustainability” or
“climate.”213 Utilizing renewable energy sources or cleaner fuels immediately improves
indoor air quality and resulting health outcomes. The provision of energy access through
renewable sources can allow communities to be more productive, increasing economic
activity and spurring traditional development goals such as poverty eradication.214
Renewable energy is also increasingly looked to as an ideal solution to addressing the
widespread lack of energy access customary in many developing countries. Whereas
fossil-fuel-based electricity systems are “poorly suited to rural areas” given challenges
that arise with grid connectivity and infrastructure, distributed renewable energy systems
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have been proven to be very effective in providing electricity to these formerly
unconnected areas.215
Landscape pressure to shift away from unsustainable energy sources is driven by
more than a desire to mitigate warming temperatures; in addition to contributing
significantly to GHG concentrations, emissions from fossil-fuel-based energy sources are
detrimental for human health, specifically by contributing to air pollution. The
International Energy Agency (IEA) writes in the 2016 World Energy Outlook that
“Energy production and use, mostly from unregulated, poorly regulated or inefficient fuel
combustion, are the single most important man-made sources of air pollutant
emissions.”216 Many premature deaths are attributable to outdoor air pollution, and this
number continues to rise despite efforts to expand renewable energy use. Due to
demographic trends and circumstances such as the increase of urbanization and rising
energy use, in particular for developing countries in Asia (including Mongolia), the IEA
predicts that these deaths will increase from 3 million in 2016 to 4.5 million in 2040.217
III.1.3 Commitments of Developed Countries to Developing Countries
The extent to which developed countries are obligated to assist in the development of
countries in the global South has been a contentious issue for decades. The international
community has been mired in an ideological debate over who should absorb the majority
of costs for mitigating climate change. The two areas in which developed countries have
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increasingly agreed to assist developing countries are technology transfer and sustainable
financing.
III.1.3.1 Technology Transfer
The UNFCCC was the first international agreement to establish that developed
countries were obligated to help developing countries; in particular, a commitment to
initiating technology transfer was highlighted. The Convention clarifies that developed
countries
shall take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate,
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how
to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to
implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the developed
country Parties shall support the development and enhancement of endogenous
capacities and technologies of developing country Parties.218
The theme of technology transfer is prominent in additional agreements adopted by the
UN. Agenda 21 was also adopted by countries at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit as a
comprehensive action plan to address society’s impact on the environment. Chapter 34,
paragraph 34.4 of Agenda 21 specifically describes the need for “favourable access to
and transfer of environmentally sound technologies, in particular to developing
countries.”219 Agenda 21 highlights the need for long-term relationships to be cultivated
in order to oversee the necessary “iterative processes” involved in technology transfer.
Chapter 34, paragraph 34.10 of Agenda 21 states: “Consideration must be given to the
role of patent protection and intellectual property rights along with an examination of
their impact on the access to and transfer of environmentally sound technology.”220
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The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1998 as an agreement linked to the UNFCCC, both
reiterates and expands on developed countries’ obligations as stated in the FCCC. In
addition to aiding in the transfer of environmentally sound technologies, developed
countries are expected to contribute to the strengthening of human and institutional
capacities in developing countries.221 Technology transfer is re-emphasized in the Paris
Agreement, the second agreement linked to the UNFCCC adopted in 2015; the
Agreement implores Parties to “strengthen cooperative action on technology
development and transfer.”222
III.1.3.2 Sustainable Financing
In addition to fostering technology transfer, the provision of financing is an additional
responsibility developed countries have shouldered in order to help facilitate developing
countries. This financial support for renewable systems has enabled developing countries
to adopt renewable energy technologies. Investment in renewable energy technologies
continues to increase, and developing and emerging economies first surpassed developed
countries in renewable energy investment in 2015.223
Using analogous language to that which is used to describe technology transfer, the
UNFCCC and its linked agreements all elucidate the responsibility of developed
countries to provide financial resources for developing countries.224
In addition to the mention of financial responsibilities in international agreements,
various international institutions, such as the aforementioned Global Environment
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Facility (GEF) in 1992 and the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in 2010, have been
established with the distinct purpose of providing financial assistance to developing
countries pursuing environmental goals.225
Specific shocks unrelated specifically to sustainability and energy further motivated
countries to provide sustainable financing opportunities. The global financial crisis
spurred the United Nations Environment Programme to propose a $3.1 economic
stimulus package called the “Global Green New Deal,” which outlined three objectives:
reviving the global economy, reducing carbon dependency, and furthering the
Millennium Development Goal of ending extreme world poverty.226 This led countries
such as China, the United States, South Korea, and France to allocate billions of dollars
towards the development of green technologies.227 Overall, the global market for clean
technologies grew 31% between 2008 and 2011.228
III.1.4 Composition of Global Energy Sources
As the landscape level has slowly evolved to further incorporate principles and
practices of sustainable development, energy as an overarching concept has subsequently
transformed, further aligning with sustainable development practices. Fossil fuel energy
sources continue to dominate the makeup of global energy systems, although the shares
of each fossil-fuel source have shifted since the mid-twentieth century (Figure 8). While
the percentage of energy use from oil, coal, and natural gas was the same in 2014 (81%)
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as it was in 1986, within this 81%, oil has declined, whereas natural gas and coal have
both increased (19% to 21% and 25% to 28%, respectively).229

Fig. 8. Shares of primary energy sources (percentage) (BP, 2017).

The impacts of specific shocks at the landscape level are visible in Figure 8,
specifically, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. While each crisis arose out of different
geopolitical and economic circumstances, both led to relatively immediate spikes in the
price of oil, leading to the notable declines in oil’s share of the world’s energy supply.230
While countries responded differently to these shocks, many European nations moved to
reduce oil dependency.231
In addition to the oil industry, the nuclear energy sector has experienced similar
specific shocks. These shocks often result in regional, as opposed to global, effects given
229
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individual countries’ distinct relationships with varying energy sources. For example, in
Germany’s electricity transition, the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident (in which an
explosion in one of the power plants reactors led to the release of radioactive debris)
mobilized anti-nuclear activists, who began to promote the use of alternative energy
sources.232
An additional landscape shock occurred in 2011 with the nuclear accident at the
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant in Japan. The accident prompted action from Japan that
reverberated out to include many Asian countries, including Mongolia. Following the
Fukushima accident, CEO and Chairman of Japan’s SoftBank Corporation founded the
Renewable Energy Institute (formerly Japan Renewable Energy Foundation) with the
intent of accelerating renewable energy development in Japan and internationally. The
concept of the Asia Super Grid (ASG) was introduced at the event establishing the
Institute, which also included a presentation about Mongolia’s eventual contribution to
the Grid from the chairman of Newcom LLC, a Mongolian company.233 The ASG would
connect electricity grids across multiple Asian nations; currently, the concept is supported
by China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and Mongolia.234
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III.1.5 Normative Framing
Gradual landscape changes have also been furthered by normative framing, such as
the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set in 2015, as well as organizations
that increasingly highlight achieving universal access to sustainable energy. SDG7 in
particular is to “ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for
all.”235 In 2011, former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon launched the organization
Sustainable Energy for All (SEforAll) to mobilize action around the three components of
SDG7: “ensuring universal access to modern energy services,” “doubling the share of
renewable energy in the global energy mix,” and “doubling the global rate of
improvement in energy efficiency.”236 Following the creation of SEforAll, the UN
General Assembly declared 2012 as the “International Year of Sustainable Energy for
All,” and the period 2014-2024 as the Decade of Sustainable Energy for All.237 The UN
has initiated efforts to promote renewable energy for decades, supporting the
development of an international agency dedicated to renewable energy since 1981.238
There is not one specific body within the UN to promote renewable energy; rather, efforts
are spread across multiple UN agencies, such as the UN Environment Programme
(UNEP), the General Assembly, and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). Outside
of the UN, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) was founded in 2009
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with the mission of promoting “the widespread adoption and sustainable use of all forms
of renewable energy.”239
III.2 Domestic Factors
In addition to favorable conditions shaped by the evolution of landscape factors at the
international level, Mongolia’s energy transition has also been helped by unique domestic
landscape conditions, such as Mongolia’s historic proclivity towards international
participation.
III.2.1 Embrace of International Community
Mongolia’s good standing with the international community has catalyzed the ease
with which Mongolia pursues development projects. While Mongolia has independently
made progress on determining its development agenda and goals, much of the pressure
for it to adopt policies towards a larger goal of sustainable development stems from
international partners.
Mongolia’s geopolitical strategy is highly dependent on its physical placement
between two authoritarian global powers, Russia and China. Mongolia’s National
Security Concept clarifies its “third neighbor” strategy, which specifies that “bilateral and
multilateral cooperation with highly developed democracies in political, economic,
cultural, and humanitarian affairs shall be undertaken.”240 Coined in 1990 by former
United States Secretary of State James A. Baker, the term “third neighbor” was used to
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describe the U.S.’s relationship to Mongolia (with its other two neighbors being China
and the former Soviet Union).241
Mongolia’s proclivity towards international participation is evident in its diplomatic
forays. Mongolia prides itself on being a diplomatic partner to many, even countries that
others turn away from—it maintains diplomatic relations with both South and North
Korea.242 The country sent troops to Iraq to support the United States from 2003 to 2008,
and still has troops in Afghanistan.243 Additionally, Mongolia’s presence among
democratic international organizations is notable considering Mongolia’s geopolitical
status. Mongolia served as the chair of the Community of Democracies from 2011 to
2013.244 Mongolia is also one of only nine NATO “partner” nations, with other Asian
partner nations being Japan and the Republic of Korea.245
One of the most active international organizations in Mongolia is the UN; this activity
is facilitated through multiple agencies and organizations, such as the UN Development
Programme (UNDP) and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), but also through the
facilitation of Mongolia’s participation in various UN treaties and agreements—
Mongolia is party to 14 different UN conventions and treaties related to the
environment.246 While many of these conventions and treaties do not require parties to
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take action, certain agreements require parties to complete various reports and progress
updates. Mongolia ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC
in 1993 and has since signed on to both agreements linked to the Convention as well, the
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement (ratified in 1999 and 2016, respectively).247 The
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement all specify different reporting
requirements that any party to the treaties must meet.
Even before Mongolia expressed an explicit interest in sustainable development as an
overarching focus for its domestic policy agenda, external actors enabled the country to
consider such a path: the seminal document that outlines Mongolia’s wind energy
potential was sponsored by two organizations in the United States—the Department of
Energy and the U.S. Agency for International Development.248 The agencies’ exact
motivation to undertake an assessment of Mongolia’s wind energy resources is unclear;
the only information available is that the agencies were, at the time, “sponsoring a
program to help accelerate the use of wind energy technology in Mongolia.”249 Since the
publication of Mongolia’s Wind Energy Resource Atlas in 1998, international interest in
Mongolia’s renewable energy potential only continues to grow.
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Chapter IV: Regime Level
IV.1 Incumbent Regime
The existing energy regime in Mongolia is characterized by a heavy reliance on coal
and decentralized energy systems. The energy system in Mongolia is composed of five
independent systems: the Central Energy System (CES), the Western Energy System
(WES), the Altai-Uliastai Energy System (AUES), the Eastern Energy System (EES), and
the South Gobi Region. Three are centralized power grids (CES, WES, EES), the latter
two are isolated systems.250 In total, these energy systems support nine combined heat
and power (CHP) plants, 600 small diesel generators, 13 hydroelectric plants, and
multiple solar and wind systems both off- and on-grid.251 CHP plants are responsible for
the vast majority of Mongolia’s electricity capacity; in 2017 they accounted for about
88% of installed capacity.252 However, Mongolia’s renewable energy capacity has
increased substantially since the first large-scale wind farm went into commission in
2013. Renewable energy accounted for 10.16% of installed capacity in 2017, and is set to
increase to 21.79% by 2019.253 Due to the fact that domestic capacity is unable to
sufficiently meet energy demand, Mongolia imports about 20% of its electricity, coming
mainly from Russia (and to a lesser extent, China).254
Many technologies currently operate within Mongolia’s energy industry (Table 5).
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Table 5
Existing technologies in Mongolia’s energy industry (Adapted from Technology Needs Assessment, Volume 2)
(Ministry of Environment and Green Development, 2013a).

Service
Category
Electricity Fossil fuel
supply

Technology
Combined heat and
power, large-scale

Diesel for electricity
generation
Renewable Small-scale
energy
hydropower plant
Small-scale solar PV
Solar and wind
hybrid technologies
Large-scale wind*

Heat
supply

Fossil fuel

Large-scale solar
PV*
Combined heat and
power, large scale
Heating stations for
space heating and
domestic hot water

Description
Produces the majority of Mongolia’s
electricity and heat energy, there are 7
throughout the country
Supplies electricity to province centers not
connected to central grid
Operates in capacities from 150kW to
12.0MW, 13 in total
Generate electricity for herders using
independent solar PV systems
Built in some soum centers (wind power
stations as well as combined solar-wind
stations)
Supplies electricity to the central grid, began
operating in 2013
Supplies electricity to the central grid, began
operating in 2015
Produces the majority of Mongolia’s
electricity and heat energy, there are 7
throughout the country
Used in province centers

Energy use in Mongolia is governed by a compendium of laws addressing various
components of the industry. Most important is the Law on Energy, passed in 2001 by
Parliament to “regulate matters relating to energy generation, transmission, distribution,
dispatching and supply activities, construction of energy facilities, and energy
consumption.”255
Energy consumption is dominated by the industry and construction sectors (Figure 9).
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1%
3%

7%

12%

47%
12%

Industry and construction
Household and communal housing
In-plant use
Transmission and distribution losses
Transport and communication
Agriculture
Others

18%

Fig. 9. Electricity consumption by sector (Ministry of Energy, 2014).

A CHP plant is a type of thermal power plant that uses waste heat as an input to
generate more electricity and heat.256 There is currently a proposal to construct CHP5 in
Mongolia, financially backed by multiple MDBs and international organizations,
including the Asian Development Bank, Engie (France), Nippon Export and Investment
Insurance (Japan), and POSCO (South Korea).257 Plants that are planned for construction
include CHP5 in Ulaanbaatar, the Tavan Tolgoi thermal power plant, the Baganuur
thermal power plant, and thermal power plants in western Mongolia, one for export
(Shivee Ovoo), and one in eastern Mongolia (Dornod). Combined, these plants would
add 1950MW for use in Mongolia, with 9240MW to be exported from Shivee Ovoo.
Three additional projects not included in the six aforementioned plants are at varying
steps in the approval process: the Chandgana Coal project (east of Ulaanbaatar) the
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Tevshiin Gobi power station, and a 100MW expansion for power plant 4 in Ulaanbaatar.
These would add another 1300 MW.258
Mongolia plans to build several thermal electric power stations near coal mines
throughout the country in the next several years. There is currently a proposal to build a
pulverized coal thermal supercritical power plant at the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine, with a
capacity of 600MW.259
Mongolia also has a limited number of hydropower plants. Despite proposals to
construct more than 70 large and mid-sized dams, only two have been built—Durgun (12
MW) and Taishir (11 MW). Additionally, there are 10 small plants that produce
hydroelectricity. These plants have limited installed capacity and are unable to operate in
winter due to freezing temperatures and resulting ice.260
The cement and lime industries are key manufacturing industries for Mongolia, and
contribute significantly to Mongolia’s GHG emissions.261 Emissions in all sectors in
Mongolia have dramatically increased from 1990 to 2014: emissions from the energy
sector increased 55.69%, agriculture 58.02%, and waste 187.49%.262
IV.2 Drivers of Regime Tension
While coal has been the dominant energy source in Mongolia for decades, the
incumbent system has been put under increasing pressure in recent years due to numerous
tensions within the regime. These include economic uncertainty, technological
258
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shortcomings, dissatisfaction with externalities from coal production (such as rising air
pollution), and shifts in political agendas.
IV.2.1 Technological
The incumbent regime faces additional pressure from the technological limitations of
existing infrastructure. Due to the fact that many of Mongolia’s coal-fired TPPs were
constructed between 1960 and 1980, they are likely to be retired in the near future; the
average efficiency rate of these plants is below 30%.263 A lack of management in the
energy sector and poor incentives to increase the efficiency of heating systems results in
significant energy loss during heat distribution, making heat supply costly and highly
unreliable. Thus, there is enormous potential to improve the efficiency of Mongolia’s
heating systems.264 However, there is little motivation for the public to conserve heat;
rather than being billed for heating based on consumption, citizens are billed based on the
area of their homes and apartments.265
As Mongolia’s energy demand has increased, its reliance on imported energy has
consequently increased. In order to stabilize the power system, Mongolia has turned to
energy imported from Russia: imports increased to 1195.5 gigawatt-hours (GWh) in
2013, compared to a recorded 366 GWh in 2012.266 The Government of Mongolia
projects that annual energy demand will increase 500-600 megawatts (MW), or 3.5%, by
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2020.267 Mongolia also imports electricity from China to supply towns along its southern
border, as well as the Oyu Tolgoi mine.268
IV.2.2 Markets and Finances
With the guidance of various international partners, Mongolia continues to emphasize
the expansion and utilization of sustainable financing practices. Initiated by the Dutch
Development Bank (FMO), the International Financial Corporation (IFC), the Trade and
Development Bank of Mongolia, the Mongolian Banker’s Association, and the Banking
and Finance Academy, the country’s first Sustainable Financing Forum took place in
2013, and has been happening annually since.269 The Forum is a chance for domestic and
international actors to gather for the purpose of furthering Mongolia’s sustainable
financing goals, and is organized by both Mongolian and international actors.270 Also
established with the Forum was the Mongolian Sustainable Finance Initiative, which
began as a tool to prioritize sustainable finance. All Mongolian banks committed to
implementing the Initiative in 2013.271 In order to further break down and address
barriers that persist to Mongolia’s pursuit of sustainable finance, the National Sustainable
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Finance Roadmap of Mongolia was developed by the IFC, the Mongolian Sustainable
Finance Association, and the UN Environment Programme.272
Mongolia’s focus on sustainable finance has extended to the creation of a domestic
fund to expand access to sustainable financing to previously under-addressed sectors of
the economy.273 The country also received support from international organizations,
including multiple UN organizations, the IFC, and the Global Green Growth Institute
(GGGI) to launch the Mongolia Green Credit Fund (MGCF). The MGCF is a national
financing vehicle that will allow the government to meet targets set in various sustainable
development policies.274
IV.2.3 Political
In order to support the construction and implementation of renewable energy projects,
the Government of Mongolia has proposed and enacted laws and agendas that better align
with a vision of sustainable energy. In addition to the Law on Energy, Mongolia’s energy
sector is governed by the Renewable Energy Law of Mongolia, adopted in 2007 and most
recently amended in 2015. The Law defines relevant terms, clarifies apposite authorities,
and outlines regulatory practices in regards to Mongolia’s renewable energy sector.275
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The Renewable Energy Law dictates responsibilities for various actors and levels of
government with respect to renewable energy. Included are the state parliament, the
cabinet, the Ministry of Energy, local governors of aimags, soums,276 and Ulaanbaatar,
and the Energy Regulatory Commission.277 Each of these actors plays a prominent role in
overseeing and enacting energy policy. Parliament approved the National Renewable
Energy Program (NREP) in 2005, which put forth a plan for the renewable energy
industry from 2005-2020.278 In order to address the future of Mongolia’s energy sector,
Parliament approved the State Policy on Energy in 2015, which details plans to reform
the sector from 2015-2030.279 These reforms are to be implemented in two stages: 20152023 and 2023-2030. In the first phase, the government aims for construction of six coal
power plants to be completed. Goals within this period also include doubling the installed
capacity, meeting the 10% installed capacity target for hydropower with two hydropower
plants, and increasing renewable energy to 20% of installed capacity.280 In the second
phase, renewable energy will be increased to 30%, smart energy systems will foster
connection between regions with high-voltage transmission lines, and high-voltage
transmission lines will export any excess energy to Northeast-Asian countries.281
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In 2015, the Law on Energy was amended with the goal of “strengthen[ing] publicprivate partnerships and creat[ing] a market-oriented framework for the energy sector.”282
With the passing of the Law on Energy was the creation of Mongolia’s Energy
Regulatory Commission, responsible for overall regulation of the energy sector, including
the generation, transmission, distribution, dispatch, and supply of energy.283 Amendments
to the Law on Energy include goals of bringing electricity imports down to zero, yet this
goal will come at the cost of constructing additional coal power plants and hydropower
plants.284
The Government of Mongolia has also adopted numerous environmental policies in
recognition of and to contribute to the ongoing regime shift. As Mongolia continues to
prioritize sustainable development, multiple environmentally-oriented policies have been
adopted (Table 6). These environmental policies are both the result of Mongolia-led
initiatives, as well as collaborative efforts to further define how Mongolia pursues
sustainable development.
Table 6
Environmental and sustainability policies implemented in Mongolia (Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 2017:25).

Name
Law on Environmental Protection
Water Law
Forest Law
Law on Air
National Action Programme on Climate Change
Law on Energy
Law on Renewable Energy
National Agriculture Development Policy
Law on Waste
Green Development Policy
282

Year Passed
(Amended)
1995 (2007, 2012)
1995 (2004, 2010, 2012)
1995 (2012, 2013)
1995 (2012)
2000 (2011)
2001 (2015)
2007 (2015)
2010
2012
2014
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284
Ana-Maria Seman, Mongolia’s Energy Sector, 13.
283

In Effect
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
2011-2021
N/A
N/A
2010-2021
N/A
2014-2030
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State Policy on Industry
State Policy on Energy
State Policy on Forest
Sustainable Development Vision, 2030

2015
2015
2015
2016

2015-2030
2015-2030
2016-2030
2016-2030

Multiple third-party organizations have enabled the Government of Mongolia to
introduce additional policy mechanisms to further codify sustainable development into
law. Since Mongolia declared that green development would be the country’s economic
development strategy in 2012, GGGI has assisted the development of green growth plans
for Mongolia’s energy and transportation sectors. Out of this partnership resulted the
Strategies for Development of Green Energy Systems in Mongolia, a project completed
in 2014 that also included collaboration with the Stockholm Environment Institute – U.S.
Center.285 Green energy systems are defined by GGGI as “those that minimize carbon,
local air pollution, and other environmental impacts.”286
Additional disruptive policies have been born out of Mongolia’s active participation
in international fora; these policies have been illuminated as the result of reporting
obligations under international agreements. Under the UNFCCC, countries are divided
into Annex I, Annex II, and non-Annex I countries; as a developing country, Mongolia is
labeled a non-Annex I party.287 Non-Annex I parties are required to submit two
documents regularly to the UNFCCC Secretariat: National Communications (NCs) and
Biennial Update Reports (BURs). National Communications are submitted by countries
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every four years after joining the Convention.288 In 2017, at the Conference of Parties
(COP) 17,289 countries decided that non-Annex I countries would also submit BURs in
addition to NCs. BURs contain updates of a nation’s GHG inventories as well as “a
national inventory report and information on mitigation actions, needs and support
received.”290
According to Mongolia’s Biennial Update Report, submitted to the UNFCCC
Secretariat in August 2017, if Mongolia fully implements the actions described in its
national programs to mitigate GHG emissions, emissions could be reduced by about 25%
by 2025 and about 28% by 2030. Two of Mongolia’s main strategies to mitigate GHG
emissions include increasing energy efficiency and the share of renewable energy,
creating additional pressure on the regime to incorporate renewable energy technologies
and phase out aging, inefficient systems.291
Mongolia’s communications to the UNFCCC are coordinated and organized by the
Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), including its NCs, BURs, and GHG
inventory—all with the goal of incorporating issues related to climate change in all
sectors.292
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Due to the fact that the Kyoto Protocol targets the emissions of developed (rather than
developing) countries, non-Annex I parties do not have reporting requirements under the
Protocol.293 In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement requires all parties to
submit reporting to the UNFCCC. As specified in Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Paris
Agreement, each party to the Agreement is required to “prepare, communicate, and
maintain successive nationally determined contributions,” referred to as NDCs—
countries’ “post-2020 climate actions.”294 As a party to the Agreement, Mongolia
submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) in September of 2015
to the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.295
Following the conclusion of COP 18 in Doha in 2012, parties agreed that developing
country parties will take Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)—
classified as “any action that that reduces emissions in developing countries and is
prepared under the umbrella of a national governmental initiative.”296 Mongolia
submitted its NAMAs to the UNFCCC Secretariat in 2010.297 The NAMAs that
Mongolia submitted proposed 22 different options (Appendix B) for mitigation actions in
six sectors—energy supply, building, industry, transportation, agriculture, and forestry.298
The UN additionally oversees optional mechanisms and tools that countries can
utilize in conjunction with mandatory reporting to further achieve sustainable
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development goals. An optional resource facilitated by the UNFCCC for developing
countries is a Technology Needs Assessment (TNA). TNAs are undertaken by
developing countries to determine their climate technology priorities. The process began
in 2001 and has evolved to include multiple intergovernmental partners that provide
technical and methodological support to countries, such as the UNEP Danish Technical
University Partnership and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). One of the crucial
outcomes of a TNA is the development of country-specific technology action plans
(TAPs)—concise, technology-specific plans to facilitate the uptake and diffusion of
technologies identified in the TNA that will assist in a country’s actions towards climate
change mitigation and adaptation.299
With the assistance of multiple international organizations, Mongolia completed a
TNA in 2013 and credits funding of the document to the GEF. UNEP, the UNEP-Risoe
Centre, and the Regional Centre Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, are additionally
mentioned. The report does clarify that the project resulted from a “fully country-led
process,” overseen by Mongolia’s Ministry of Environment and Green Development.300
In Mongolia’s TNA, the energy sector was identified as the primary contributor to the
country’s GHG emissions; thus, multiple technologies with the potential to decrease
Mongolia’s GHG emissions were identified. These technologies were presented to
relevant stakeholders (Appendix A), who were asked to categorize each based on a score
of variables. The three technologies prioritized following an assessment of each’s costs
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and benefits were large-scale hydropower plants, wind turbines, and pulverized coal
combustion technologies.301
IV.2.4 Socio-Cultural
In addition to regime tensions arising from technological limitations of Mongolia’s
existing energy infrastructure, numerous social pressures have led the Mongolian
Government to explore the implementation of alternative energy sources. Addressing
social inequalities has historically driven the Government of Mongolia’s (GoM) efforts to
introduce sustainable energy technologies, specifically the issue of insufficient energy
access. In 2001, the GoM approved the Sustainable Energy Sector Development Strategy
Plan (2002-2010) to expand energy access to rural herding communities. The plan
detailed the reform of soum electricity markets as well as the development of dieselrenewable energy hybrid systems.302 The lack of feasibility of connecting rural herding
families to centralized grid systems led the GoM to explore self-sustaining systems,
specifically in the form of small-scale renewable energy systems.
Moreover, negative externalities arising as the result of an overreliance on coal has
further pushed the GoM to explore sustainable energy options. Air pollution has grown
rapidly in Mongolia, particularly in the capital Ulaanbaatar, as more people migrate from
the countryside to the city. Many of these people elect to live in traditional Mongolian
structures, gers, which are portable homes utilized by the nomadic population; over 60%
of Ulaanbaatar’s population live in the ger districts, neighborhoods composed of gers.
Inside the gers, stoves burn fuel (coal, wood, dung) to provide heat; in the city, this fuel is
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primarily coal for its longer-burning duration and lack of access to animals for the use of
dung. It is these coal stoves that contribute primarily to Ulaanbaatar’s air pollution.303
Complications from air pollution are responsible for 10% of all deaths in Ulaanbaatar.304
In 2017, the Government of Mongolia approved the National Program on the
Reduction of Air and Environmental Pollution.305 In May 2019, a ban on burning raw
coal, which is primarily used to heat gers, will go into place. This ban is part of the
government’s efforts to focus on improving, rather than unrealistically prohibiting, coal
use in the ger districts; residents will be required to replace raw coal with refined coal.306
The issue of air pollution has gained further traction with renewable energy proponents.
In addition to the Government of Mongolia, various NGOs and CSOs actively advocate
for increasing renewable energy use as a means of combatting air pollution.307
Civil society organizations (CSOs) and NGOs exist throughout Mongolia and are
primarily located in Ulaanbaatar. According to Mongolians familiar with the energy
industry and renewable energy development, NGOs and CSOs working specifically on
the issue of citizen engagement with renewable energy are limited. In 2017, the
Mongolian Wind Energy Association was renamed to become the Mongolian
Renewables Industries Association (MRIA) with the purpose of generally supporting the
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growth of renewable energy (as opposed to solely promoting wind energy).308 MRIA’s
members are comprised of numerous companies involved in the renewable energy
industry, including both Mongolian companies as well as their international partners—as
of March 2019, the page listed 34 such companies.309 MRIA is now responsible for
organizing Mongolia’s National Renewable Energy Forum (NREF), which takes place
every May. The NREF has been critical in expanding Mongolians’ knowledge about
ongoing and future renewable energy projects; being open to the public, the Forum grows
in attendance with every year.310
Regarding education, Mongolia is working to increase public knowledge and
awareness about its sustainable development agenda. Curricula for secondary schools in
Mongolia are shifting to include a Sustainable Development Education program.311
Public perceptions about renewable energy have evolved in conjunction with the makeup
of Mongolia’s renewable energy systems. Before the widespread construction of largescale renewable facilities, renewable energy would evoke thoughts of small, singlehousehold systems—a consequence of the 100,000 Solar Gers program. As publicity has
grown showcasing the construction and implementation of large-scale systems,
perceptions have shifted.312
GGGI has also been active in campaigns to increase the Mongolian public’s
knowledge about sustainable development issues. GGGI released a series of videos in
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2018 aimed at secondary school-aged children to educate them on issues such as air
pollution and energy efficiency. GGGI partnered with the Mongolian Ministry of
Environment and Tourism, as well as the Ulaanbaatar city government, to disseminate the
videos to eco clubs in the country.313
IV.3 Barriers to Further Regime Change
IV.3.1 Technological
There are significant barriers at the regime level to successfully increasing
Mongolia’s renewable energy capacity. Despite Mongolia’s recognition that electricity
and energy will be critical in meeting GHG emission reduction goals, the electricity and
heat sectors face problems of insufficient funding, low coal quality, and the use of
obsolete technologies and techniques.314
IV.3.2 Markets and Finances
Although the government has worked diligently to adequately equip investors and
project managers with laws to support renewable energy projects, there is still
uncertainty. Because no criteria exist to reject applications for renewable energy licenses
if renewable energy levels in an area are exceeded, it is possible for project developers to
be granted a license but be unable to proceed with the project. Thus, developers may
invest to secure a license only to be unable to recover their investments.315

313

“Child-Friendly, Inclusive, and Green Lifestyle Videos Produced by the GGGI Mongolia Team Are
Being Used at Assembly of Mongolian Children’s Eco Clubs,” GGGI - Global Green Growth Institute, last
modified April 10, 2018, accessed March 26, 2019, http://gggi.org/child-friendly-inclusive-and-greenlifestyle-videos-produced-by-the-gggi-mongolia-team-are-being-used-at-assembly-of-mongolian-childrenseco-clubs/.
314
Mongolia’s Initial Biennial Update Report, 15.
315
Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Programme (SREP): Invetsment Plan for Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar:
Ministry of Finance of Mongolia, 2015), 14.

90

Mongolia’s economy has been rife with volatility since the country transitioned from
a communist country to a democratic country with a market economy in 1990. Soviet
assistance “disappeared almost overnight in 1990 and 1991,” resulting in widespread
economic and social chaos.316 During the transition, there was
scant concern for proper training in the rule of law, a solid banking system,
appreciation of contracts, government officials’ understanding of the need for a strict
division between their public responsibilities and their private commercial gains, and
stringent rules curtailing nepotism and favoritism, generated considerable profiteering
and corruption.317
Many of these problems continue to persist in some form today. The current Government
of Mongolia has “limited capacity to financially support investment projects in important
sectors, most notably, energy, mining, and agriculture; and must rely on FDI [foreign
direct investment] to support its broad economic and development agendas.”318
Mongolia’s economic conditions are highly reliant on the status of the country’s
mining sector. In 2016, the sector accounted for 85% of Mongolia’s exports, 21% of its
GDP, and over 30% of the national budget revenue. Two projects in the mining sector,
the OT copper-gold project and the Tavan Tolgoi coking coal project, are expected to
drive Mongolia’s GDP for the next multiple decades. OT specifically is projected, at full
capacity, to produce close to 3% of the world’s copper output.319 Between 2004 and
2008, GDP growth in Mongolia was around 9% on account of both gold production and
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global copper prices.320 In 2009, despite passing legislation to develop the massive OT
copper and gold mine with Anglo-Australian multinational mining company Rio Tinto,
Mongolia’s economy slowed significantly after investors lost confidence due to a
“dispute with foreign investors.”321 While investor confidence was largely restored in
2015 after the country formalized an agreement with Rio Tinto to restart the development
of OT, the economy has still faced struggled significantly. GDP growth in Mongolia
peaked at 17.3% in 2011 and sharply fell in subsequent years as a result of the global
recession and the resulting decline in commodity prices, reaching 1.2% in 2016 (Figure
10).322

Fig. 10. Annual GDP of Mongolia (1982-2017) (Data from World Bank, 2017).
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Due to the volatility of Mongolia’s economic system and the reliance placed on its
mining sector, Mongolia has received significant financial support from various
international organizations. At the end of 2016, the Mongolian government prepared an
“Economic Recovery Program,” approaching the IMF for additional financial assistance.
The Program aims to, among multiple objectives, promote economic diversification,
“protect the most vulnerable in society,” and strengthen the financial sector.323 Since
Mongolia’s democratic transition, the country has received multiple funding packages
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as financial assistance from allies.
The IMF and Mongolia reached a $236 million Stand-by Arrangement (SBA) in 2009,
helping Mongolia to strengthen its banking sector and fiscal management.324 The IMF’s
SBA allows countries to receive financing from the IMF during an economic crisis, and
allows for a quick response to address balance of payments problems. SBAs are typically
distributed for short-term balance of payments problems, rather than longer-term.325
In April 2017, the IMF approved a three-year extended arrangement under the
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) for Mongolia, with Mongolia’s total financing package
from the IMF, World Bank, ADB, Japan, and Korea totaling about $5.5 billion.326 IMF
assistance under an EFF is usually reserved for countries facing “medium-term balance of
payments problems because of structural weaknesses.” As opposed to SBAs, EFF
assistance aims to address structural and pervasive underlying problems within a
country’s financing regime. Countries borrowing from the IMF under an EFF commit to
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implementing policies to ameliorate structural economic problems. In order to assure
countries are on track with stated goals, the IMF regularly assesses countries’
performance and is able to adjust the EFF as necessary.327 Most recently, in October
2018, the IMF Executive Board conducted its Fifth Review of Mongolia’s EFF.328
In addition to the IMF, the United States has been active in distributing financial
assistance to Mongolia for decades. Notably, Mongolia received a $285 million aid
package from the Millennium Challenge Corporation to be carried out from 2008-2013,
“focused on property rights, vocational education, health, road infrastructure, and energy
and the environment.” Mongolia was approved to receive a second aid package from the
MCC in December 2014 worth $345 million.329
IV.3.3 Political
Like many developing countries, the efficacy political system in Mongolia is hindered
by public perceptions, corruption, and limited institutional capacity. After falling to the
Manchu Qing dynasty in 1636, Mongolia declared independence in 1911. Yet even after
this declaration, the government of China still considered present-day Mongolia, or
“Outer Mongolia,” part of China, invading the country in 1919. Mongolia became a
socialist country in 1921 after expelling the Chinese with the aid of Russia’s Red Army;
from 1920 to 1990, Mongolia was under single-party communist rule. The democratic
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revolution that led to the political system Mongolia has now began in 1990. With this
democratic transition also began Mongolia’s transition to a market economy.330
There are three primary political parties in Mongolia—the Mongolian People’s
Revolutionary Party (MPRP), the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP), and the Democratic
Party (DP)—with self-professed orientations of left, center-left, and center-right. Despite
these orientations, in practice, ideological distinctions are “practically indiscernible.”331
The MPRP was founded in 1924, and Article 82 of Mongolia’s original constitution
described the Party as a “guiding force” as well as the “vanguard of the working people”
until the article was abolished in 1990.332
Mongolia’s political system is plagued by rampant corruption, which remains a
prominent problem for both foreigners conducting business in Mongolia and Mongolian
citizens. Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index ranked
Mongolia 103 out of 180 countries, with a score of 36 out of a possible 100—a decrease
from its peak of 39 in 2015 and 2014.333 The 2006 Anti-Corruption Law sets criminal
penalties for official corruption, but the law continues to be poorly enforced, with
contributing factors including “conflicts of interest, lack of transparency, lack of access to
information, an inadequate civil service system, and weak government control of key
institutions.” A National Program to Combat Corruption was approved by Parliament in
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2016, along with the initiation of Mongolia’s second National Action Plan under the
Open Government Partnership.334
Investigation of corruption cases is primarily conducted by Mongolia’s Independent
Authority Against Corruption, with assistance from the National Police Agency’s
Organized Crime Department.335 As noted by the Department of State in its annual
Human Rights Report, “Members of parliament are immune from prosecution during
their tenures.”336
Citizens’ faith in the current government’s ability to address corruption is limited; a
report from the Asia Foundation found that only 11% of respondents believe the
government elected in 2016 will improve on corruption while 21.3% think the
administration will be worse than the previous.337 The percentage of individuals who
view corruption as a major problem increased to 11.8% in 2018 compared to 9.9% in
2017, although a majority of respondents view unemployment (33.2%) as a major
problem.338 The percentage of individuals who respond that they agree that “corruption is
a common practice in our country” increased in 2018 to 75.8%, from 70.1% in 2017.339
While it is not possible to directly link corruption to election turnout, turnout in
Mongolia’s presidential election has generally decreased since the country’s first
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democratic presidential election in 1993 (Figure 11).

Fig. 11. Turnout in Mongolian presidential elections 1993-2017 (Data from Mongolian General Elections Commission,
2017).

Mongolia’s most recent presidential election took place in 2017 and involved two
rounds of voting after no candidate received a majority in the first round; a notable 8.23%
of individuals cast blank ballots in the second round (compared to 1.37% in the first) as a
form of protest.340 Khaltmaa Battulga, candidate from the DP, won the 2017 presidential
election with 50.61% of the vote.341
In addition to corruption, high turnover consistently impedes the efficacy of the
Mongolian government (GoM). According to interviews with individuals working for
organizations that partner with the GoM, this translates to slower progress on projects and
unpredictability regarding who long-term government counterparts may be.342 Despite
rampant corruption and persistent bureaucratic challenges, Mongolia is still heralded as a
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democratic success story by many in the international community. In 2016, former U.S.
Secretary of State John Kerry referred to Mongolia as an “oasis of democracy” given its
two communist neighbors.343
An additional challenge is the separation between agencies tasked with implementing
related policies. Within the Mongolian government, multiple agencies are responsible for
formulating and implementing policies related to the environment. Regarding Mongolia’s
intended nationally determined contribution under the Paris Agreement, the various
ministries listed include the MET, Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Industry, Ministry of
Construction and Urban Development, Ministry of Road and Transport, and Ministry of
Agriculture.344 In 2012, the MET (formerly the Ministry of Environment and Green
Development) was elevated to be one of the four core ministries within the government,
signifying the ministry’s increased importance.345 Within ministries, various committees
and offices have been established to address climate change adaptation; however, these
smaller bodies have been subject to political volatility. For example, following the
passage of the Law on Air in 2012, the government established a National Climate
Committee to coordinate sectoral efforts on climate change as well as the Climate
Change Coordination Office (CCCO), tasked with coordinating UNFCCC responsibilities
and general oversight pertaining to laws and regulations, within the Ministry of
Environment and Green Development. Due to political turnover, the CCCO was
dissolved in 2015, only for the Ministry of Environment, Green Development, and
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Tourism to establish the Climate Change Project Implementing Unit based largely on
former CCCO staff.346
IV.3.4 Socio-Cultural
Mongolia’s climate produces unique challenges for energy technology production.
Energy efficiency in Mongolia depends both on operating and technology practices as
well as the country’s climatic variation.347
Moreover, while public awareness of renewable energy projects has increased,
knowledge is still limited. Given that renewable energy has been presented as an avenue
for addressing a wide swath of societal issues, supporters are ideologically fragmented,
necessitating multi-faceted campaigns that are often uncoordinated.348
IV.4 Divergence from the Multi-Level Perspective
The ways in which Mongolia’s energy transition diverge from the traditional path
outlined by the MLP are especially visible at the regime level. Most prominently,
divergence occurs regarding the presence of transnational actors and donor interventions,
the state of Mongolia’s incumbent regime, and normative framing of the ongoing
transition. Whereas energy transitions in developed countries have been and continue to
be led by domestic agencies and actors, Mongolia’s transition, in a similar manner to
many in the global South, is highly dependent on transnational linkages and actors.
Moreover, the presence of intermediaries has enabled the Government of Mongolia to
both initiate and see to fruition projects that would be domestically unfeasible.
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The current state of Mongolia’s regime is similarly in line with that of other
developing, rather than developed, countries. Mongolia’s coal-fired power plants are far
from highly functional, echoing the aforementioned state of disrepair and dilapidation
that often applies to incumbent systems in the global South.349
Finally, the normative conversations driving Mongolia’s energy transition occupy a
starkly different space than is to be expected from developed countries’ transitions.350
Framing renewable energy as a potential mitigation technique for air pollution is
reflective of the fact that developing countries often face much more pressing issues than
being existentially environmental. Where “sustainability” as an abstract concept fails to
gain traction as a primary motivator for the adoption of renewable energy systems, air
pollution amelioration is a concrete and imaginable societal ideal.
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Chapter V: Niche Level
V.1 Drivers of Niche Momentum
V.1.1 Technological
Niche technologies, such as solar photovoltaic (PV) panels and wind turbines, were
first introduced in Mongolia through the “100,000 Solar Gers” program. Small-scale PV
systems were initially distributed throughout the Mongolian countryside to nomadic
herder families in 2000, when the Government of Mongolia began the program with the
aim of increasing the country’s overall electricity access by providing 100,000 portable
solar home systems to herder families. Prior to “100,000 Solar Gers,” the vast majority of
herders and Mongolia’s rural population lacked access to electricity. This lack of access,
according to the World Bank, was primarily due to
(i) high costs of household power systems coupled with low incomes of many herder
households; (ii) substantial logistic difficulties of developing the supply chain to
support a decentralized market for a small and mobile customer base spread over a
vast landscape; and (iii) a nascent market which lacks basic quality and service
standards.351
By 2005, aided by grants from donor countries, the government had distributed over
30,000 solar home systems to herder families.352 When the program began to plateau in
2005, the government looked to international sources for assistance; in 2006, the World
Bank agreed to assist through the Renewable Energy for Rural Access Project (REAP).353
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The completion of Mongolia’s Technology Needs Assessment in 2013, which
outlines actions it can take to both mitigate and adapt to the effects of climate change,
allowed for additional multiple niche technologies to be introduced and integrated into
Mongolia’s industries. Considering that the energy sector is the largest producer of GHG
emissions, the TNA specifically identified technologies that could mitigate GHG and
contribute to social, environmental, and economic development.
Mongolia’s TNA identifies many potential technologies for the energy supply
subsector. After stakeholders reviewed the presented technologies, a shortlist was
compiled (Table 7).354
Table 7
Shortlist of potential technologies for energy subsector (italicized items are those ultimately selected) (Adapted from
Technology Needs Assessment, Volume 2, 29) (Ministry of Environment and Green Development, 2013a).

Energy Service
Electricity
supply

Category
Renewable
energy

Fossil fuels
Heat supply

Fossil fuel

Technology
Large-scale dam-based hydro for electricity supply
(more than 100MW)
Medium-sized dam-based hydro for electricity supply
(10-100MW)
Pumped storage hydroelectricity
Wind turbines – on-shore, large-scale
Solar PV (off-grid, grid connected, solar home system)
Solar thermal –CSP, central receiver tower, parabolic
through collector and dish
Carbon capture and storage
Integrated coal gasification combined cycle
Pulverized coal combustion with higher efficiency
Heat-only boilers for space heating and domestic hot
water

In order to determine which technologies would be ideal for Mongolia to pursue, an
assessment was created to score each technology based on its costs and expected
economic, social, and environmental benefits. Costs included capital costs, operational
and maintenance costs, and cost effectiveness of mitigation. Benefits included economic
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(energy supply improvement, balance of payments), social (healthcare improvement), and
environmental (reduced air pollution, GHG emission reduction by 2030). National
consultants prepared Technological Fact Sheets (TFSs) for each of the shortlisted
technologies that included information on the technology’s potential for reducing GHG
emissions, how it might impact Mongolia’s development (economic, social,
environmental, market) priorities, and costs. Using the information provided in the TFSs,
identified stakeholders (Appendix A) scored each technology based on the
aforementioned criteria. Any technology identified as the least preferred option for any
category received a zero. Following the scoring process, each criterion was assigned a
weighted value based on its importance.355 After scoring the above technologies based on
projected costs and benefits, the top three selected were large-scale hydropower, wind
turbines, and pulverized coal (PC) combustion technologies.356
In order to facilitate the implementation of these three technologies, TAPs were
developed for each technology. Each TAP outlines a description of the technology, the
target for diffusion, current projects in progress, barriers to the technology’s diffusion,
and proposed steps to implement the technology, broken down into economic and
financial, policy and regulatory, network, and market.357
Large-scale hydropower plants (HPPs) are classified as non-market public goods.
They require immense investment and funding and are few in number. Approval for the
construction of large-scale HPPs is granted by the government. The main barrier to
implementing HPPs is Mongolia’s low electricity tariff, as any electricity generated by
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HPPs with capacity greater than 5MW is not covered by the feed in tariff specified under
Mongolia’s Renewable Energy Law. There are additional barriers to the development of
large HPPs—politics being the main one.358
The second priority technology identified by the TNA is large-scale wind park
projects. For large-scale wind park projects, the most significant barrier is the capacity
limit of Mongolia’s grid system.359 Wind propellers with a capacity of 50-100 watts
provide power to about 30,000 households.360 Barriers defined in the TAP for large-scale
wind turbines include economic and financial (high capital cost, inappropriate financial
incentives, high transaction cost, lack of inadequate access to financial resources [sic]),
technical (system constrain [sic]); network (weak connectivity between actors favoring
the new technology, lack of involvement of stakeholders in decision-making); and policy,
legal, and regulatory (policy intermittency and uncertainty, highly controlled energy
sector, lack of professional institutions).361
The final priority technology identified by Mongolia’s TNA for further development
was pulverized coal (PC) thermal supercritical power plants. The inclusion of an option
that utilizes coal is recognizant of the fact that while Mongolia’s large coal reserves make
continuing to utilize coal a pragmatic choice, in order to reduce the environmental
pollution that existing plants produce, Mongolia must look for an option that reduces the
current externalities resulting from existing coal power plants. Pulverized coal thermal
supercritical (or ultra-supercritical) power plants are a more efficient, environmentally
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friendly alternative to Mongolia’s existing coal-fired thermal power plants. Supercritical
and ultra-supercritical plants allow for higher efficiency due to operating at higher steam
temperatures and pressures—pollution levels are reduced as less coal per MWh produced
is burned.362 As opposed to conventional PC power plants with an efficiency of around
35%, ultra-supercritical plants can attain an efficiency level of 45%. This increase in
efficiency is projected to decrease emissions of CO2 about 33%.363
In addition to projects where only one renewable technology is developed, projects
utilizing multiple renewable sources are also being explored. In September 2018, the
Asian Development Bank approved a $40 million USD loan for the development of a
41MW distributed renewable energy system. The system, the first of its kind in
Mongolia, will utilize a variety of renewable energy sources in order to provide power
and heating to remote regions in the country’s western regions. These regions currently
rely on imported energy from Mongolia’s neighboring countries, which is highly
expensive and carbon-intensive.364
Mongolia’s utilization of international financing opportunities reflects a larger trend
of Mongolia partnering with both countries and international organizations to advance
renewable energy priorities. Mongolia has also been active in partnering with the
government of Japan to implement renewable energy projects. Under Japan’s Joint
Crediting Mechanism (JCM), inspired by the CDM and the Kyoto Protocol, Japan can
implement projects in developing countries and receive credit towards its obligations
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under the Kyoto Protocol. Mongolia was the first country to sign a JCM bilateral
agreement with Japan in 2013; as of September 2018, there are 17 countries that have
since signed JCM bilateral agreements. 365 There are five CDM-registered projects in
Mongolia: the Salkhit wind farm, the Durgun hydropower project, the Taishir
hydropower project, a retrofit program for heating stations, and MicroEnergy credits.366
V.1.2 Markets and Finances
One of the primary catalysts for Mongolia’s renewable energy transition has been
transnational support in the form of donor interventions. The Green Climate Fund (GCF)
has been increasingly active in Mongolia, providing financing for projects addressing a
wide swath of sustainable development priorities. In 2016, the GCF approved a project in
order to enable Mongolian bank XacBank to better support loans sought by Mongolian
businesses investing in renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. The project’s
impetus arose from the large majority of Mongolian businesses that rely on outdated and
inefficient equipment and thus emit high levels of GHGs. Ultimately, the project seeks to
foster the implementation of long-term low-carbon systems to allow businesses to lower
financial costs and reduce their environmental impacts. Total investment for the project is
$60 million USD, split between the GCF, the Global Climate Partnership Fund (GCPF),
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and Developing World
Markets (DWM). 367 The GCPF is a public-private partnership established in 2009 by the
German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and
365
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Nuclear Safety as well as German bank KfW Entwicklungsbank; the Fund’s goal is to
mitigate climate change by supporting GHG reduction in emerging and developing
markets.368 Founded in 1994, DWM is an investment manager dedicated to emerging and
frontier markets.369
Financing for Mongolia’s renewable energy projects is increasingly shifting towards
being locally, as opposed to internationally, driven. After becoming the first private entity
in a developing country to receive accreditation from the GCF in 2016, Mongolian bank
XacBank signed an agreement with the GCF in November 2017 to utilize GCF funds in
order to become the first local bank to finance the construction of a large-scale solar plant
within the country.370 XacBank has since been approved by the GCF to finance two
projects in Mongolia.371
In March 2018, the GCF approved a project to create eco-districts in Ulaanbaatar in
order to form zones throughout the city that are climate resilient, low-carbon, and
affordable. In a similar vein to the GCF’s other projects, funding is also being provided
by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Total investment for the project is $544 million
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USD.372 Another GCF project was approved in October 2018 to provide loans to
Mongolian households for the installation of energy efficient appliances and housing
structures. With a total project investment of $21.5 million USD, co-financing for the
project is also provided by XacBank, as well as through a grant from French NGO
Groupe Energies Renouvelables, Environnement et Solidarités.373 In addition to
Mongolia-specific projects, other GCF projects encompassing a range of developing
countries also involve Mongolia. These projects address various GCF target areas and
involve countries sharing traits with Mongolia’s own development.374
V.1.3 Political
The niche level is also characterized by the implementation of novel policies. Newell
describes niche developments as including policies in addition to technologies if the
policies are initiated by landscape-level actors—for instance, a donor-funded feed-intariff would be considered a niche policy.375 As Mongolia continues to develop
economically, niche policies have been implemented to better address issues such as
investment and competition. A small number of these policies relate both directly and
indirectly to the development of renewable energy technologies, such as Mongolia’s
feed-in-tariff (FiT). Mongolia implemented a FiT in 2014, but was unsuccessful. The
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amended Law on Renewable Energy, passed in 2015, sought to replace the FiT with a
feed-in premium.376
In 2015, Mongolia’s parliament passed a new Value-Added Tax (VAT) Act to
replace the existing VAT law, which had been in effect since 2006. The Act aims to more
accurately reflect the evolution of various sectors in Mongolia and economic
development strides that the previous law did not adequately account for.377 Within the
act, a number of sectors and goods are named exempt from the VAT Act, including
“equipment to be used for renewable energy surveying, research and production along
with the accompanying devices and parts.”378 Interviewees credited the VAT law changes
with drawing in critical actors necessary for funding and implementing large-scale
renewable energy systems.379
A presentation from the head of Mongolia’s Ministry of Energy’s Investment and
Production Division in October 2018 describes additional laws that the country has
implemented or amended to promote the development of regional energy systems. These
include the Concession Law (2010), Investment Law (2013), Amendment to the Law on
Energy (2015), Amendment to the Law on Renewable Energy (2015), and Amendments
to the Custom Law and Tariff Laws (2015).380 Interviewees were unable to recall if the
376
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government initiated the passage of these laws, or if international organizations were
responsible, but they did speak to the effectiveness of these amendments to bring an
influx of foreign investment towards development of additional renewable energy
systems.381 Regarding the implementation of additional niche policy interventions,
multiple interviewees spoke about the prospects of auctioning. Opinions differed on
whether or not auctioning would be realistic. One interviewee did note that within the
past year, Parliament had discussed the inclusion of amendments to the Renewable
Energy Law but that these amendments were not approved.382
In addition to driving much of the momentum behind the development of projects
utilizing niche technologies, international actors are also responsible for the realization
and construction of these projects. Construction of Mongolia’s large-scale renewable
energy facilities, particularly solar and wind, has been initiated and overseen by various
multinational corporations. There has so far been a pattern for the trajectory of large-scale
renewable projects: international organizations or governments secure funding and
resources necessary for the projects, a Mongolian partner company is identified (or
established for the purpose of the project), and the project proceeds as a partnership
between both Mongolian and external actors.
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In September 2018, President of Mongolia Khaltmaagiin Battulga urged the
commencement of the Asia Super Grid’s second phase, the East Asia Super Grid, which
would connect across Japan as well as South Korea and China.383
V.1.4 Socio-Cultural
Regarding where Mongolia could potentially locate large-scale wind and solar energy
production, the Gobi Desert—with high wind resources, low moisture and temperatures,
and 300 days of sunshine per year—has been identified as an optimal location.384
Compared to other desert areas, the Gobi Desert offers more efficient energy
production.385 Potential energy production from the Gobi desert area is five times greater
than the annual world power demand in 2015.386 The Gobi Desert’s renewable energy
potential has inspired the Gobitec concept, a proposal to connect the Gobi desert area
with locations of high energy demand.387 Eventually, the Gobitec project would be able
to transmit energy produced through the ASG. Similar to the Gobitec project is the
DESERTEC project, which would deploy renewable energy produced in the Middle East
and North Africa to both meet domestic demand and, using any electricity surplus, supply
electricity to Europe. 388
In order for the full ASG to be realized, the cooperation of all countries involved as
well as multiple intergovernmental organizations is critical. Intergovernmental
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organizations will likely include: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC),
the Asian Development Bank, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific (ESCAP), the International Renewable Energy Agency, and the Energy Charter
(EC). Existing challenges to the ASG include the need for an improved investment
climate (due to the project’s capital-intensive nature), regional electricity, stability, and
improved property rights (on account of Mongolia and China’s existing weak protection
of intellectual property rights).389
In addition to the benefit of being able to sell electricity to other nations, Mongolia
will be able to reap many tangible benefits from the creation of the ASG. These include
economic benefits (job creation, diversification of the local economy), social benefits
(poverty alleviation, improved infrastructure), and environmental benefits (reduced air
pollution, protection of natural environment). It is estimated that between wind and solar
technologies, the project will generate an income greater than nine billion USD over a
16-year period in Mongolia. Job diversification will come from the introduced renewable
energy technologies industry, allowing for reduced dependency on Mongolia’s mining
industry for jobs.390
V.2 Existing Niche-Innovations
Figure 12 details renewable energy projects both in operation and planned throughout
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Fig. 12. Renewable energy projects in operation and planned (Jambaa, 2018).

Mongolia. As of July 2017, there were eight different renewable energy license holders:
Sainshand Wind Park LLC, AB Solar Wind, Aidiner Global, Cleantech, Clean Energy
Asia, Desert Solar Power Wind, Huduggiin tsahilgaan, and the Ulaanbaatar Usan tseneg
power plant. The total capacity of these license holders is 642.4 MW.391 Renewable
energy in Mongolia exists in the form of hydropower plants, wind turbines, and
photovoltaic (PV) systems.
V.2.1 Wind Energy Systems
Wind power systems have rapidly increased in Mongolia since the country’s first
large-scale non-hydro renewable energy facility, the Salkhit wind farm, became
operational in 2013.392 Multiple additional large-scale wind energy facilities are planned
for construction across Mongolia, including a wind farm planned to supply 52 MW of
electricity generation capacity, set to begin commission in 2017 and located in Sainshand,
a town in the Gobi Desert.393
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Salkhit. The Salkhit wind farm was the first large-scale wind farm to be constructed
in Mongolia. Financing for the wind farm was provided by multiple international
organizations and governments. Debt and equity funding for the project was provided in
part by the EBRD.394 Clean Energy LLC, the Mongolian company that oversaw the
construction of the Salkhit wind farm, was established in 2004. Owners of Clean Energy
include Newcom LLC (51%, Mongolian), General Electric (21%, American), the EBRD
(14%), and the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO, 14%).395 Turbines
powering the Salkhit wind farm were manufactured by GE.396
Sainshand. In 2009, the Mongolian company Sainshand Salkhin Park LLC was
established for the construction of the Sainshand wind farm, in the Sainshand soum,
Dornogovi aimag.397 The Sainshand wind farm is sponsored by Ferrostaal (German
project developer), ENGIE (French energy company), Danish Climate Investment Fund,
and a Mongolian entrepreneur (Radnaabazar Davaanyam). The European Investment
Bank (EIB) and the EBRD are providing long-term financing for the project. 398 On
September 17, 2018, the Sainshand wind farm was connected to Mongolia’s energy grid.
Sponsors contributed $120 million to fund the project, which was completed by CMEC
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Corporation of China.399 The company overseeing construction of the Sainshand wind
farm, Clean Energy Asia (CEA) LLC, is a joint venture that was founded in 2012 by
Newcom LLC and the renewable energy arm of Japan’s SoftBank Group, SB Energy
Corporation. CEA is 51% owned by Newcom, 49% owned by SB Energy Corp.400
Mongolia’s Technology Needs Assessment completed in 2013 reviews the possibility of
constructing a wind farm in Sainshand, including the project’s objectives, how it would
align with Mongolia’s sustainable development priorities, technical aspects, as well as
potential challenges. Challenges include transportation of equipment, as well as
incentivizing technology transfer and transaction costs. The Ministry of Energy is
referenced as being responsible for coordinating and overseeing relationships with private
companies and international financing organizations.401 The turbines used in the
Sainshand Wind Park are manufactured by Vestas, a Danish company.402
Tsetsii. A partnership between Japan and the EBRD, the Japan-EBRD Cooperation
Fund, provided Mongolia with a $750,000 grant to modernize an electricity substation
near the future site of the Tsetsii wind farm. In addition to Mongolian company Newcom,
Japanese company SoftBank group is developing the Tsetsii wind farm. The EBRD,
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along with Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is planning to co-finance the
project.403
Choir. The Choir wind farm is being overseen by the Aydiner Group, a Turkish
company.404
V.2.2 Solar Energy Systems
In addition to wind energy systems, both small- and large-scale solar photovoltaic
(PV) systems exist in Mongolia. Since the initiation of 100,000 Solar Gers, the focus on
solar PV in Mongolia has shifted to large-scale systems, as foreign governments and
investors have begun initiating and developing large-scale projects.
Darkhan: Mongolia’s first large-scale solar farm is located in Darkhan, a city north of
Ulaanbaatar. The solar farm has a capacity of 10MW, and went into operation on January
1, 2017. Solar modules for the plant were provided by the Japanese company SHARP
Corporation.405 In addition to PV modules provided by SHARP, German companies
supplied additional equipment to ensure the plant would function in Mongolia’s extreme
temperatures reaching -40˚C.406 The plant was jointly pursued by two Japanese
companies—SHARP Corporation and Shigemitsu Shoji Co., Ltd.—and Mongolian
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company Solar Power International.407 The project was registered under the JCM.408
Solar Power International was founded in October 2015.409
Monnaran: An additional project under the JCM is the Monnaran Project, a
combination 10MW solar plant-agriculture system (referred to as Solar Farm®
technology).410 Power generation, as well as operations and maintenance of the solar farm
are overseen by Everyday Farm LLC, a joint venture pursued by Mongolian company
Bridge Corporation and Japan company Farmdo LLC, established in 2012.411 Operations
commenced on November 25, 2017, with construction beginning in 2015.412
New Airport: The solar plant near Mongolia’s new international airport was financed
partially by a loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the ADB’s first renewable
energy loan with a company in Mongolia’s private sector.413 The New Airport project is a
JCM project.414 Additional technical oversight and project sponsorship is being provided
by Thai company Sermsang Power Corporation.415 Mongolian company Tenuun
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Construction LLC is owned by Sermsang, Sharp Energy Solutions (Japan), AMOE Solar
LLC (Mongolia), and SH Energy Solution LLC (Mongolia).416
Sumber: The Sumber solar project was financed by Mongolian bank XacBank with
assistance from the GCF.417 The Sumber solar plant is operated by Mongolian power
company ESB, with technological input for the project provided by Japanese firm Sankou
Seiki. The plant has a total of 31,000 solar panels and went into commission in January
2019.418
Other solar projects that are being pursued include a 10MW SPP in Choir, as well as
a 15MW SPP in Zaminuud.419
The Mongolian Government continues to expand its ability to initiate and implement
projects related to sustainable development. Whereas projects coordinated through the
UNDP were once solely direct implementation, increasingly projects are nationally
implemented—the difference being UNDP versus GoM led, respectively.420
V.3 Barriers to Further Niche Developments
V.3.1 Technological
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The IPCC lists three main barriers to technology transfer: “inadequate technical
expertise and know-how”, “the absence of professionals in the country able to negotiate a
suitable transfer agreement,” and “the willingness of the technology owner to transfer the
technology.”421 Regarding overcoming the first two barriers, the necessary solution is
training and education; for the third, financial support in addition to encouragement from
either the originating or recipient country or international bodies may be necessary.
Even though Mongolia has received technical support for the construction and
deployment of niche technologies for its existing large-scale renewable systems, there is
substantial room for additional assistance at the regime level. According to Mongolia’s
Third National Communication under the UNFCCC:
“There is a strong need to provide technical capacity for certain issues of climate
change namely MRV [measurement, reporting, and verification], NAMA, the
readiness of climate finance, climate change adaptation, and vulnerability and M&E
[monitoring and evaluation], GHG inventory, reporting, research, and technology
transfer.”422
Mongolia’s most pressing technical problem is the lack of institutional knowledge and
appropriate technologies.423
V.3.2 Markets and Finances
Moreover, additional barriers include “a lack of support by financial institutions for
renewable energy investments (particularly hydro power plants).”424 Rather than official
development assistance, “the implementation of economic and regulatory instruments,
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higher per capita income and schooling levels and with stable, democratic regimes” is
correlated with an acceleration of NHRE diffusion.425
V.3.3 Political
There are additional barriers that arise as a result of unanticipated political and
economic circumstances. Even given the detail, thought, and intention put into
Mongolia’s TNA, the reality on the ground six years later presents a slightly different
picture of actions Mongolia has taken to mitigate the effects of climate change through
energy sector reforms. Hydropower, while present, is not responsible for the majority of
renewable energy sources in Mongolia. Construction of large-scale PV plants continues
to expand rapidly in Mongolia, despite their exclusion in Mongolia’s TNA as a priority
technology. This exclusion appears to be the result of consultants’ analysis on the
associated capital costs for large-scale PV; in comparison to wind’s estimated capital cost
of $5 million USD/year, solar was estimated to have an associated capital cost of $16m
USD/year. Similarly, operational and maintenance costs for solar were calculated to be
$23m USD/year, compared to wind’s $5.5m USD/year. The cost of solar eclipsed all of
the other shortlisted technologies as well, leading it to score a zero in the assessment
category for capital costs. Considering that capital costs were more heavily weighted than
any other category in the assessment, solar was not selected as a priority technology,
despite scoring more highly than other selected technologies in categories such as
reduced air pollution, healthcare improvement, and energy supply improvement.426
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Pfeiffer and Mulder, “Explaining the Diffusion of Renewable Energy Technology in Developing
Countries,” 287.
426
Technology Needs Assessment: Volume 1 - Climate Change Adaptation in Mongolia (Ministry of
Environment and Green Development, 2013), 54, accessed November 4, 2018, http://www.techaction.org/Participating-Countries/Phase-1-Asia-and-CIS/Mongolia.
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This disparity between the TNA recommendations and the reality in Mongolia is
likely due to unforeseen financial opportunities. While solar continues to necessitate high
capital costs, financing for large-scale solar has been readily available from international
organizations and donor countries. At Mongolia’s 9th National Renewable Energy Forum,
which took place in 2018, a representative from the Ministry of Energy presented that
more special licenses have been issued for photovoltaic plants than any other category of
renewable energy system—29 compared to five for wind and three for hydropower. The
total capacity from these 29 licenses is stated to be 727 MW.427 This expansion can be
attributed to immense investments. According to a data from the country’s Energy
Regulatory Commission, total investments in planned solar PV projects since 2013 equal
$1,221 million USD, compared to only $582m for wind parks and $533m for
hydropower.428
Regarding domestic political capacity, the ability to implement further niche policies
will likely be hindered by political instability as mentioned in reference to Mongolia’s
existing regime. When asked about the inefficacy of the Mongolian Government due to
high turnover and shifting political agendas, interviewees responded that while the
current situation impeded progress, they did not foresee the initiation of substantial
institutional changes to ameliorate current conditions; rather, people have become
accustomed to the challenges and recognize that they are a part of the policy process.429
V.4 Divergence from the Multi-Level Perspective
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O. Bavuudorj, “Present Status and Challenges of Energy Sector in Mongolia.”
Jambaa, “National Renewable Energy Forum - 2018.”
429
Anonymous, multiple (GGGIa, UNDPb), interviewed by author, Ulaanbaatar, March 19-22, 2019.
428
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Similarly to Mongolia’s divergence from the MLP at the regime level, the presence of
intermediaries, transnational actors, and donor interventions also contributes to
discrepancies at the niche level. The ability for niche technologies and policies to be
introduced and implemented in Mongolia is highly dependent on Mongolia’s partnerships
with international organizations and its relationships with donor countries. As a result of
these organizations and countries seeking to shift the overall status quo of energy regimes
worldwide, they were highly receptive to engaging in programs and projects in Mongolia.
While niche technologies have been built in and brought to Mongolia from third-party
organizations and countries, technology transfer to domestic industries has been limited
so far. Domestic production of niche technologies in Mongolia is limited; for Mongolia’s
large-scale wind farm in Salkhit, the turbines were manufactured by GE and imported.430
While by MLP standards this lack of transfer to domestic production may be seen as
indicative of a lack of development and institutional capacity, interviewees importantly
pointed out that the lack of domestic production is simply a matter of costeffectiveness—regardless of Mongolia’s role in initiating its energy transition, it is far
cheaper to import renewable energy infrastructure from companies in other countries.431
This speaks to the argument that the “phasing-in of green technologies in developing
countries is less about discovering new technological niches and more about utilizing the
opportunities already present that coincide with development objectives” (emphasis in
original).432
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“GE Taps Growth in Mongolia by Powering Nation’s First Wind Farm Project.”
Anonymous (ADB), interview by author, Ulaanbaatar, March 18, 2019.
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René Kemp and Babette Never, “Green Transition, Industrial Policy, and Economic Development,”
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 33, no. 1 (February 7, 2017): 67. (Emphasis in original).
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Chapter VI: Survey and Interview Data
Due to limited external resources on the status of Mongolia’s renewable energy
development, research included conducting in-person surveys and interviews in
Ulaanbaatar and additional sites in Mongolia. Survey and interview data were collected
during two separate phases: May 2017 and March 2019. In May of 2017, the research
focused on Mongolians’ perceptions of renewable energy, including the government’s
agenda and attitudes towards existing infrastructure. This research involved surveying
and interviewing citizens of Mongolia, including those residing near large-scale
renewable energy projects, those living in Ulaanbaatar, and individuals working directly
on issues relating to renewable energy, whether it be policy or development.
VI.1 Methodology
VI.1.1 Location
Surveys were disseminated during May 2017 in Darkhan, Salkhit, Hatgal, and
Ulaanbaatar (Figure 13). Due to the fact that the first survey was distributed prior to

Hatgal
Darkhan
Ulaanbaatar

Fig. 13. Survey locations (Esri, HERE, Garmin, NGA, USGS, 2019).

Salkhit
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significant research, an additional survey was developed following interviews with
professionals in the development and renewable energy fields. Survey sites were selected
based on both available travel opportunities and the presence of large-scale renewable
energy facilities—Darkhan being the site of Mongolia’s first large-scale solar farm and
Salkhit the site of the first large-scale wind park.
VI.1.2 Participants
A total of 94 individuals were surveyed (Table 8).
Table 8
Logistics for each survey.

Survey
I
II

Sites
Darkhan
Salkhit
Hatgal
Ulaanbaatar

Respondents
35
21
8
30

Questions
8
10

Dates
May 10-11, 2017
May 14, 2017
May 21, 2017
May 24, 2017

The first survey was distributed to individuals residing in the vicinity of large-scale
renewable energy facilities in the city of Darkhan and town of Salkhit, both living
directly next to and slightly removed from the facilities (Figure 14). Survey II was
distributed to individuals not residing near large-scale renewable energy facilities, in the
town of Hatgal and city of Ulaanbaatar (Figure 15). No individual completed both Survey
I and Survey II. Refer to the appendices for copies of each survey in English and
Mongolian.
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3

10

8
17
18

38

10

Individuals nearby renewable
project

General population: Ulaanbaatar

Individuals in direct vicinity of
renewable project

Teachers

Individuals removed from
renewable project

Residents in ger district

Lake Huvsgul National Park

Fig. 14. Survey I: Makeup of respondents’ residences.

Fig. 15. Survey II: Makeup of respondents.

The majority of survey respondents were between the ages of 30-49 (Figure 16).
2

3

2

1

<18

8

6

19-29
9

12

30-39
40-49
50-59

14

60-69

17

70+
7
Fig. 16. Age demographics of Survey I (left) & II (right) respondents.

Survey respondents were asked about their perceptions of renewable energy, as well as if
and how renewable energy has impacted their lives. Translators were utilized in all
survey locations to maximize the survey’s accessibility and number of respondents.
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VI.2 Limitations
VI.2.1 Surveys
Rather than a single survey, two surveys were developed as a result of incomplete
information prior to dissemination of Survey I. After Survey I was distributed, additional
interviews were undertaken with renewable energy and development experts; information
gleaned from these interviews directly informed the revised questions in Survey II. The
only questions replicated from Survey I were “What do you think of the government’s
goal to have 30% of its energy sourced renewably by 2030?” and “Have you received any
education about renewable energy?”.
This revision meant that Survey I respondents were unable to answer questions from
Survey II that are critical to this research, such as how respondents thought public
awareness about renewable energy should be improved. Alternatively, Survey II
eliminated relevant questions from Survey I, such as if respondents would be open to
installing a renewable energy system in their own homes. Survey II was not distributed to
anyone living in the direct vicinity of large-scale renewable projects, thus, it was not
possible to compare individuals’ knowledge about Mongolia’s renewable energy policy
between those directly next to versus removed from large-scale RE systems.
VI.2.2 Interviews
The primary limitations for conducting interviews in March 2019 were the language
barrier and limited availability of interviewees. While it is possible to use translators
throughout Ulaanbaatar, due to the increased logistical challenges posed by coordinating
translators and securing Mongolian-speaking interviewees, this option was not pursued.
This is tied to the second limitation of limited availability; the allocation of a single week
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towards visiting Mongolia in-person. Thus, if interviewees were unavailable during the
single week, interviews were not conducted.
VI.3 Data Analysis
Surveys were reviewed and common themes were identified within answers where
respondents either elaborated or provided extraneous information. All answers from both
Survey I and Survey II were entered into a single spreadsheet.
Notes were typed during interviews and reviewed after to ensure accuracy of
information. Common themes were identified from interview answers, which were then
combined onto a single document organized by theme and interviewee.
VI.4 Results
VI.4.1 Lack of Information
In response to the questions “How much do you know about the electricity grid in
Mongolia?” and “How much do you know about renewable energy policy in Mongolia”
on Survey II, rates of response were similar, with fewer than 10% indicating that they
knew a lot about the existing electricity grid (Figure 17). Only one individual responded
that they knew a lot about Mongolia’s renewable energy policy.
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70

% of respondents

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
A lot
Current electricity grid

Some

Not much

Renewable energy policy

Fig. 17. Survey II: Comparison of respondents' knowledge of Mongolia’s existing electricity grid and renewable energy
policy.

8.1%

13.5%
Lack of information
48.6%

No interest
Cost
Other

29.7%

Fig. 18. Survey I: Motivation for not wanting to install residential renewable energy system.

The majority of respondents attributed a lack of information as the primary reason they
answered no to the question “Would you ever be open to installing a renewable energy
system (i.e. solar panels) for your own home?” (Figure 18).
Survey II respondents additionally reported minimally discussing renewable energy
with their family, friends, and coworkers. When asked, “How often do you talk about
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renewable energy with people (family, friends, coworkers, etc.)?”, 47.4% responded
“infrequently,” 44.7% responded “never,” and just 7.9% responded “frequently.”
Survey II respondents were also asked about if they thought the public should know
more about renewable energy, and if so, how public awareness about renewable energy
should be improved. The majority of respondents believed that the government and civil
society should primarily be responsible for increasing public awareness (Figure 19).
5.3%

Government
campaigns

15.8%
34.2%

Civil society/NGO
campaigns
Organic conversation
Education

15.8%

Fig. 19. Survey II: How public awareness about renewable energy should be improved.

There appears to be a potential disconnect between public expectations of the
government’s role regarding renewable energy and ministries’ own expectations. What is
interesting is that although most respondents in Survey II thought the government should
be responsible for increasing public awareness about renewable energy, the government
has largely stayed away from championing public awareness campaigns, instead,
delegating this task to NGOs and civil society groups, as well as those organizations
involved in development.433
VI.4.1 Normative Perceptions
433

Anonymous (GGGIa), interview by author, Ulaanbaatar, March 20, 2019.
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Survey I answers obtained from individuals residing near turbines of the Salkhit wind
farm reflected trends identified with social acceptance of renewable energy projects.
Specifically, two respondents expressed feeling initially skeptical towards the
construction and implementation of the turbines, specifically in reference to uncertainty
over their effect on birds and their own herds. Two respondents did say that
representatives from the company visited in-person to describe the project and its
environmental impacts.434 One respondent living in the direct vicinity of the turbines
stated that they thought the turbines had led to more storms, leading him to move his
winter herding site as a result of the changes in weather.435
At least one respondent spoke directly to the differentiation that has been previously
noted regarding how individuals developing countries perceive normative reasoning for
installing renewable energy systems. When asked if she would be interested in installing
her own solar energy system, one respondent replied “No, because I already have
electricity.”436 This is strikingly similar to the aforementioned statement by an individual
in Tanzania who was asked about incentives for installing renewable energy systems: “It
doesn’t have anything to do with climate change; it is driven by rural electrification and
people wanting electricity.”437
Despite a lack of knowledge about renewable energy systems, very few Survey I
respondents expressed negative views of renewable projects. 52.8% responded they had a

434

Survey I responses: IS-WF1, IS-WF5
Survey I response: IS-WF2
436
Survey I response: IS-N1
437
Amars et al., “The Transformational Potential of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions in
Tanzania,” 95.
435
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“positive” perception of renewable energy projects, 41.5% responded “neutral,” and 5.7%
responded “negative.”
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Conclusion
Mongolia’s ongoing energy transition speaks to what others have found regarding the
limitations of the MLP’s applicability to developing countries. Originally developed as a
framework meant to explain historical energy transitions in developed European nations,
the MLP is insufficient to explain many of the nuances unique to energy and
sustainability transitions in developing countries. Thus, many authors have argued for the
inclusion of additional frameworks and variables beyond the MLP in order to adequately
explain ongoing transitions.
Specifically for Mongolia, the role of transnational linkages, in the forms of
intermediaries and donor interventions, has been paramount. Mongolia’s transition is
characterized by niche technologies (wind turbines, PV panels) and policies (feed-intariff, value-added tax exemption) that have been fully developed for other contexts and
are being introduced into Mongolia’s unique environment. The transfer of these
technologies has been successful largely due to partnerships Mongolia has fostered with
international actors and its allies; projects are built according to long-term plans rather
than singular and isolated ambitions. Mongolia has effectively involved the private sector
in renewable energy project processes through the founding of private Mongolian
companies to partner with international organizations and governments in order to see
projects to fruition.
The majority of barriers affecting the development of renewable energy in Mongolia
stem from the regime and niche level. Mongolia’s incumbent regime is entrenched not
only due to reliance on existing systems, but limited domestic political and economic
capacity to initiate change, despite the government’s ideological prioritization of
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sustainable development. Fortunately for Mongolia, it has been able to capitalize on its
pre-existing relationships with the international community to foster long-term
investment in renewable energy projects. This has resulted in limited cases seen in other
countries where isolated transition projects do not lead to large-scale regime change.
Consideration should continue to be given to the normative aspects of Mongolia’s
transition; specifically, the diffusion of renewable energy for purposes other than the
Western notion of existential environmentalism rooted in an appeal to morality.
In the future, Mongolia should continue to draw on these relationships to ensure that
future growth aligns with the government’s long-term priorities. Ensuring that any
development projects are suitable for factors unique to Mongolia will continue to be
crucial, as sustainable development continues to expand as a primary tool to combat the
effects of climate change.
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Appendix A

Stakeholders Identified in Mongolia’s Technology Needs Assessment438

Adapted from Technology Needs Assessment: Volume 2 - Climate Change Mitigation in Mongolia, 10.
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Appendix B
Mongolia’s Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions439
Sector
Energy supply

Subsector
Renewable options
Coal quality
Heating boiler efficiency

Household stoves &
furnaces

Building

CHP plants
Electricity use for local
heating
Improve energy efficiency

Industry

Improve energy efficiency

Transport
Agriculture
Forestry

439

Action
PV and solar heating
Wind power
Hydropower
Coal beneficiation
Coal briquetting
Improve efficiency of existing HOBs and install boilers
with new design and high efficiency
Convert hot water boilers into small capacity thermal
power plants
Change fuels for household stoves and furnaces
Modernize existing and implement new design for
household stoves & furnaces
Improve efficiency and reduce internal use
Use of electricity from grid for individual households in
cities
Improve district heating systems in buildings
Install heat and hot water meters in apartments
Improve insulation for existing buildings and
implement new energy efficiency standards in new
buildings
Improve lighting efficiency in buildings
Improve housekeeping practices
Implement motor efficiency improvements
Introduce dry-processing in cement industry
Use more fuel-efficient vehicles
Limit the increase of the total number of livestock by
increasing the productivity of each type of animal,
especially cattle
Improve forest management

Adapted from “Copenhagen Accord: Appendix II - Mongolia: Nationally Appropriate Mitigation
Actions of Developing Country Parties.”
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Appendix C
Survey I (English)
Renewable Energy Policy Survey
Name:
Age:
Area of residence:
Number of people in household:
For the following questions, please check all boxes that apply to you. Thank you!
1. What is your perception of renewable energy projects?
⎕ Positive
⎕ Negative
⎕ Neutral
⎕ Other (please explain below):
2. What do you see as the future of renewable energy in Mongolia?
⎕ More projects from the government and foreign companies
⎕ More projects from private companies
⎕ Fewer projects overall
⎕ Other (please explain below):
3. What do you think of the government's goal to have 30% of Mongolia's energy come from
renewable sources by 2030?
⎕ Realistic
⎕ Unrealistic
⎕ Other (please explain below):
4. Have you received any education about renewable energy?
⎕ Yes (please explain below)
⎕ No
If yes, please explain the details of your education:
5. Have you been personally affected by the presence of renewable energy projects?
⎕ Yes (please explain below)
⎕ No
If yes, please explain how you have been personally affected below:
6. What comes to mind when you think of renewable energy projects? (Circle all that apply)
⎕ Large-scale installation (able to serve many households)
⎕ Small-scale installation (serves single household)
⎕ Other (please explain below):
7. Would you ever be open to installing a renewable energy system (i.e. solar panels) for your own
home?
⎕ Yes
⎕ No
⎕ Other (please explain below):
8. If you answered no to the previous question (7), what factors would limit you from installing your
own renewable energy system?
⎕ Cost
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⎕ Lack of information
⎕ No interest
⎕ Other (please explain below):
Please include any additional comments below:
Thank you for taking this survey!

137

Appendix D
Survey I (Mongolian)
Сайн байна уу? Та доорх судалгааг хичээнгүйлэн бөглөж өгнө үү.
Сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний бодлогын талаарх судалгаа
Таны нэр:
Таны нас:
Оршин суугаа газар:
Ам бүл:
1. Сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний төсөл, хөтөлбөрүүдийн талаар та ямар ойлголттой байдаг вэ?
А. Эерэг
Б. Сөрөг
В. Тодорхой ойлголтгүй
Г. Өөр (тайлбарлана уу)
........................................................................................................................................................
2.Монголын сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний салбарын ирээдүйг хэрхэн харж байна вэ?
А. Засгийн газар болон гадаадын компанийн төсөл давамгайлна
Б. Хувийн компануудын төсөл давамгайлна
В. Төсөл хөтөлбөрүүд бага хэрэгжинэ
Г. Өөр (тайлбарлана уу)
........................................................................................................................................................
3. Эрчим хүчний яамнаас тавьсан 2030 он гэхэд сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний үйлдвэрлэл/эзлэх
хэмжээг 30 хувьд хүргэх зорилтын талаар та юу гэж бодож байна вэ?
А. Биелэх боломжтой
Б. Биелэх боломжгүй
В. Өөр (тайлбарлана уу)
........................................................................................................................................................
4. Та сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний талаар мэдээлэл авч байсан уу?
А. Үгүй
Б. Тийм (тийм дугуйлсан бол ямар мэдээлэл авч байснаа тайлбарлана уу)
........................................................................................................................................................
5. Сэргээгдэх эрчим хүч, түүнтэй холбоотой төсөлд өөрийн биеэр хамрагдаж байсан уу?
А. Үгүй
Б. Тийм(тийм дугуйлсан бол хэрхэн хамрагдаж байсан тухайгаа тайлбарлана уу)
........................................................................................................................................................
6. Сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний төсөл гэхээр танд ямар төсөөлөл бууж байна вэ? (Нэгээс илүү
хариулт дугуйлж болно)
А. Том хэмжээний бүтээн байгуулалт (олон өрхийг хамарсан)
Б. Жижиг хэмжээний бүтээн байгуулалт (нэг өрхөд зориулсан)
В. Өөр (тайлбарлана уу)
........................................................................................................................................................
7. Та өөрийн гэртээ сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний систем (жишээ нь: нарны толь) суурилуулах
талаар бодож байсан уу?
А. Тийм
Б. Үгүй
В. Өөр хариулт (тайлбарлана уу)
........................................................................................................................................................
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8. Өмнөх асуултанд (7) үгүй гэж хариулсан бол, ямар шалтгаанууд таны боломжийг
хязгаарлаж байна вэ?
А. Өртөг өндөртэй
Б. Хангалттай мэдээлэл байхгүй
В. Сонирхож үзээгүй
Г. Бусад (тайлбарлана уу)
........................................................................................................................................................
Нэмэлт мэдээлэл байвал доор бичнэ үү.
........................................................................................................................................................
Судалгаанд хамрагдсан танд баярлалаа. Амжилт хүсье
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Appendix E
Survey II (English)
Gender:
Age:
Place of residence:
Name (optional):
1.

How much do you know about the electricity grid in Mongolia?
a. A lot (familiar with most policies and laws relating to the electricity grid)
b. Some (somewhat aware of electricity grid systems)
c. Not very much (mostly or entirely unaware of policy relating to the electricity grid)

2.

What is your perception of Mongolia’s current energy system?
a. Sustainable (will continue functioning in the long-term)
b. Unsustainable (will need to undergo change)
c. Other (please explain below)

3.

How do you feel about Mongolia’s current energy systems?
a. Satisfied
b. Unsatisfied (please explain why)

4.

How much do you know about renewable energy policy in Mongolia?
a. A lot (familiar with most policies and laws relating to renewable energy)
b. Some (somewhat aware of renewable energy policy)
c. Not very much (mostly or entirely unaware of renewable energy policy)

5.

How often do you talk about renewable energy with people (family, friends, coworkers, etc.)?
a. Never (no conversations within the past year)
b. Infrequently (a few times a year)
c. Frequently (about every month)
d. Often (at least once a week)

6.

Do you think that people should know more about renewable energy (please explain why)?
a. Yes
b. No

7.

If you answered yes to #6, how do you think public awareness about renewable energy should be
improved?
a. Government campaigns
b. Campaigns from NGOs/civil society
c. Organic conversations between people
d. Education/curricula in schools

8.

What do you think of the government’s goal to have 30% of its energy sourced renewably by 2030?
a. Realistic
b. Unrealistic
c. Other

9.

Have you received any education about renewable energy?
a. Yes
b. No
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10. Have you ever utilized renewable energy in your own life?
a. No
b. Yes (if yes, please explain how)

141

Appendix F
Survey II (Mongolian)
Хүйс:
Нас:
Оршин суугаа хаяг:
Нэр (бичихгүй байж болно):
1.

Та Монголын цахилгаан эрчим хүчний (шугам сүлжээ) тухай хэр их мэдэх вэ?
а. Хангалттай (цахилгаан эрчим хүчний тухай хууль болон бодлогуудын талаар сайн
мэддэг)
б. Бага зэрэг (цахилгаан эрчим хүчний системийн талаар бага зэрэг мэддэг)
в. Сайн мэдэхгүй (цахилгаан эрчим хүчний бодлогын талаар ихэнхийг нь эсвэл бүр юу ч
мэдэхгүй)

2.

Монголын одоо ашиглаж байгаа эрчим хүчний системийн талаар ямар ойлголттой байдаг вэ?
а. Тогтвортой (үйл ажиллагаа нь удаан хугацаанд үргэлжилнэ)
б. Тогтворгүй (өөрчлөх хэрэгтэй)
в. Бусад (доод зайнд дэлгэрэнгүй тайлбарлана уу)
__________________________________________________________________________________

3.

Та Монголын одоо ашиглаж байгаа эрчим хүчний системийн талаар сэтгэл хангалуун байдаг
уу?
а. Тийм
б. Үгүй (тайлбарлана уу)
__________________________________________________________________________________

4.

Та Монголын сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний бодлогын талаар хэр сайн мэддэг вэ?
а. Хангалттай (сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний тухай хууль болон бодлогуудын талаар сайн
мэддэг)
б. Бага зэрэг (цахилгаан эрчим хүчний системийн талаар бага зэрэг мэддэг)
в. Сайн мэдэхгүй (сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний бодлогын талаар мэдэхгүй)

5.

Та сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний тухай хүмүүстэй (гэр бүл, найз нөхөд, хамт олон гэх мэт) ярилцдаг
уу?
а. Үгүй (сүүлийн нэг жилд энэ талаар ярилцаагүй)
б. Хааяа (жилд хэдхэн удаа)
в. Тогтмол (сар болгон)
г. Байнга (дор хаяж долоо хоногт нэг удаа)

6.

Хүмүүс сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний талаар илүү их мэдэх хэрэгтэй гэж боддог уу? (Яагаад гэдгийг
тайлбарлана уу)
а. Тийм
б. Үгүй
__________________________________________________________________________________

7.

Хэрэв 6-р асуултад тийм гэж хариулсан бол хүмүүсийн мэдлэг, мэдээллийг хэрхэн нэмэгдүүлэх
хэрэгтэй гэж бодож байна вэ?
а. Засгийн газраас олон нийтийг хамарсан үйл ажиллагаа явуулах
б. Төрийн бус байгууллага/иргэний хөдөлгөөн олон нийтийг хамарсан үйл ажиллагаа
явуулах
в. Хүмүүсийн хооронд харилцан яриа зохион байгуулах
г. Сургуульд хөтөлбөр болгож оруулах
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8.

Эрчим хүчний яамнаас тавьсан 2030 он гэхэд сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний үйлдвэрлэл/эзлэх
хэмжээг 30 хувьд хүргэх зорилтын талаар та юу гэж бодож байна вэ?
а. Биелэх боломжтой
б. Биелэх боломжгүй
в. Өөр (тайлбарлана уу)
__________________________________________________________________________________

9.

Та сэргээгдэх эрчим хүчний талаар мэдээлэл авч байсан уу?
а. Үгүй
б. Тийм (тийм дугуйлсан бол ямар мэдээлэл авч байснаа тайлбарлана уу)
__________________________________________________________________________________

10. Та сэргээгдэх эрчим хүч хэрэглэж байсан туршлага байгаа юу?
а. Үгүй
б. Тийм (хэрхэн ашиглаж байснаа тайлбарлана уу)
__________________________________________________________________________________
Танд баярлалаа!
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Appendix G
Survey Codes
Codes for Survey I
City
Specific location
Darkhan
Gers/homes next to Darkhan Solar Plant
Bag government offices
Ministry of Environment and Tourism
Local market
Salkhit
Homes in general vicinity of wind farm
Homes at the base of the wind farm
Total

Code
ID-GD#
ID-BG#
ID-MNE#
ID-M#
IS-N#
IS-WF#

Codes for Survey II
City
Specific location
Hatgal
Offices within Lake Huvsgul National Park
Ulaanbaatar
Unspecified location
Ger district
School 2
Total

Code
IIH-NP#
IIU-#
IIU-GD#
IIU-S#

# Surveyed
5
7
6
17
8
13
56

# Surveyed
8
17
3
10
38
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Appendix H
Results: Survey I
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Appendix I
Results: Survey II
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149

150

151

152

153

154

Appendix J
Interview Questions (March 2019)

General questions
1. What is your name?
2. Where do you work?
3. What is your position within where you work?
Renewable energy-specific questions
4. Have you ever studied renewable energy or development in a formal academic
setting?
5. What are your thoughts on current governmental plans to increase renewable energy
use in Mongolia?
a. Do you think that Mongolia’s goal of increasing renewable energy capacity to
20% by 2030 is realistic?
6. What barriers do you feel exist to more widespread diffusion of renewable energy
technologies in Mongolia?
a. Do you believe Mongolia is adequately equipped to address these barriers? If
not, what would need to change for Mongolia to address these barriers?
7. What do you think are the best ways to increase the use of renewable energy?
8. What are your thoughts on the role of international organizations and other countries
in Mongolia’s renewable energy development?
9. Do you think Mongolia will be able to eventually have a domestic renewable energy
industry?
a. If so, what do you believe needs to happen for a domestic energy to take
form?
10. Do you believe civil society will play a role in spreading renewable energy
technologies?
11. What is your perception of the public’s knowledge regarding renewable energy
technologies in Mongolia?
12. How has Mongolia attempted to overcome challenges to renewable energy diffusion?
13. Was the implementation and amendment of laws to bolster renewable energy
investment (i.e. the VAT law, customs law, etc.) driven by domestic or international
actors?
Development-specific questions
14. How would you describe public awareness of UNDP and similar programs in
Mongolia?
15. What would you say is the biggest impediment to development in Mongolia?
a. How do you think these barriers can be addressed?
16. Do you think public support could be leveraged to increase development programs in
Mongolia?
17. Are there civil society organizations working to raise awareness about environmental
development programs in Mongolia?
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18. How would you describe the relationship between government ministries and your
team at UNDP?
a. How supportive has the government been of your project, and has this support
changed at all since you started working?
19. What is the biggest challenge you’ve faced in furthering the projects you work on?
20. What progress have you seen since starting at the UNDP on your projects?
21. What is the nature of the dialogue between different individuals/agencies/groups
pursuing different sustainable development projects?
22. Do you foresee projects like BIOFIN ever being run independently by the Mongolian
government?
23. Have you run into challenges pursuing programs due to industry (i.e. mining)
interests?
24. Does the political system in Mongolia ever pose efficacy problems?
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Appendix K
Description of Transition Management
Transition management describes four governance domains where activities during
transitions take place—strategic, tactical, operational, and reflexive. Each of these
domains details different processes necessary for a transition to be planned and take
place.
Strategic: Activities in the strategic domain include “vision development, strategic
discussions, long-term goal formulation, collective goal and norm setting, and long-term
anticipation.”440
The tactical domain is where “steering activities” take place—including actions such
as “negotiations, planning and control, financial support, programming.” Activities
include “agenda building, negotiating, networking and coalition building.”441
Operational activities are short-term and often pertain to innovation. These activities
are carried out in specific programs for innovation, as well as existing business and
industry, political, and civil society spheres. Innovation is not limited to technological
advances, and also includes “all societal, technological, institutional, and behavioral
practices that introduce or operationalize new structures, culture, routines, or actors.”442
The scope and timeline of each domain varies (Table 9).
Table 9
Characteristics of transition management levels.443

Transition
Management Levels
Strategic

440

Focus
Culture

Problem scope
Abstract/societal
system

Time scale
Long-term (30
years)

Level of
activities
System

Loorbach, “Transition Management for Sustainable Development,” 168–9.
van Welie and Romijn, “NGOs Fostering Transitions towards Sustainable Urban Sanitation in LowIncome Countries,” 252.
442
Loorbach, “Transition Management for Sustainable Development,” 170.
443
Ibid., 171.
441
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Tactical

Structures

Institutions/regime

Operational

Practices

Concrete/project

Mid-term (5-15
years)
Short-term (0-5
years)

Subsystem
Concrete
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Appendix L
Partial lists of large-scale solar and wind projects in Mongolia
List of Wind Projects
Name of
Wind Park
Salkhit

Capacity
50 MW

Owner
Clean Energy

Status
In operation

--

50 MW

Aydiner Global

--

102 MW

“Qleantech” LLC

Short-term
project (20142017)
Short-term
project (20142017)

Sainshand
Wind Park

50 MW

Sainshand Wind
Park LLC

--

100 MW

Clean Energy Asia
LLC

Tsetsii Wind
Park

50 MW

Clean Energy Asia
LLC

--

50 MW

Khiimori salkhi
LLC

--

100

AB Solar Wind

--

50

TBF International
Group

444
445

In operation
Short-term
project (20142017)
Long-term
project (20182025)
Long-term
project (20182025)
Long-term
project (20182025)
Completed
feasibility
study and
license444
Completed
feasibility
study and
license445

Location
Sergelen
Soum, Tuv
aimag
Choir city,
Govisumber
province
Khanbogd
soum,
Umnugovi
province
Sainshand city,
Dornogovi
province

Annual
generation
-123 mil
kWh
300 mil
kWh
130 mil
kWh

Bulgan soum,
Umnugovi
province
Tsogttsetsii
soum,
Umnugovi
province
Argalant soum,
Tuv province

--

Dalanjargalan
soum,

--

Bayan-Ovoo
soum

--

Angarag Myagmar, “Mongolia Wind Development Status” (Ulaanbaatar, 2016).
Ibid.

--

--
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List of Solar Projects
Name of
Solar Farm
Darkhan Solar
Farm

Capacity
10 MW

Monnaran
solar/agriculture
Darkhan II

10 MW

New Airport

15 MW,
CES

Operator
Solar Power
International,
LLC
Everyday
Farm LLC

20 MW
Tenuun Gerel
Construction
LLC

Bayanchandmani 21 MW
Sumber
Choir
Zaminuud

-10 MW
15 MW

----

Status
In operation

Location
Darkhan

In operation
Completion
November
2019
Completion
November
2018
Completion
December
2019
----

International
Involvement
JCM
JCM

Darkhan

--

Khushig Khundii ADB, JCM
Bayanchandmani JCM
----

GCF
---
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